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THE PROPOSED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975:
A CIVIL LIBERTIES CRITIQUE
Daniel Crystal*
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.

Wendell Phillips1
INTRODUCTION

Most people tend to go along on the reassuring, but highly
dangerous, illusion that because there has been publicity about a
social, political, or legal issue, the problem has been taken care of
and all dangers eliminated. Life is by no means that simple.
Now pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives are mammoth companion bills to be known, if enacted into
law, as the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975.2 Each is 753 pages
long and would "codify, revise, and reform" federal criminal law
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 S. 1,4 the Senate
* A.B., Montclair State College; J.D., George Washington University National Law
Center; Member, New Jersey, District of Columbia & United States Supreme Court Bars.
Speech by Wendell Phillips before the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, Jan. 28,
1852, in I W. PHILLIPS, SPEECHES, LECTURES, AND LETTERS 35, 52 (1892).
2 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The reform
and codification of federal criminal laws has been the subject of continuing congressional
hearings. See Hearings on Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-72);
Hearings on S. 1, S. 716, S. 1400 and S. 1401 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Hearings on S. 1 and
S. 1400 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1973-74) [hereinafter cited collectively as Hearings]. These
hearings are paginated consecutively. There have also been hearings, as yet unpublished, in
the 94th Congress.
For an overview of S. I of the 94th Congress see Schwartz, A Proposal to Overhaul the
Federal CriminalLaw, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1975, § 4, at 4, cols. 3-5 (N.J. ed.).
S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). For the
introductory statement of Senator John D. McClellan as well as the accompanying statements of Senators Hruska, Taft, and Bayh see 121 CONG. Rsc. S 33-S 38 (daily ed. Jan. 15,
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bill, and H.R. 3907,5 its House counterpart, present the country

with scores of important questions about the way our federal criminal laws are to be codified. This is particularly so when it is
realized that these twin bills in many instances contain retrogressive
proposals that are taken over bodily from a bill-S. 1400 6-which
was offered in the last Congress to codify the federal criminal laws
and which had been drafted by the Department of Justice to reflect
the views of law and order of former President Richard M. Nixon
and former Attorney General John Mitchell.7
Those who have taken the trouble to read these massive bills
have recognized that they would in practical effect go far down the
road toward repealing important provisions in the Bill of Rights.
Unless public attention is focused on what these companion bills
contain, there is a very real danger that some of their startling
regressive provisions may be enacted into law. It may well prove
that while Watergate received the headlines in 1974, and that the
country appears to have the easy assurance that the dangers exemplified by Watergate are behind us, the real threat to constitutional
8
freedoms as we have known them is contained in these twin bills.
Commentators have observed that S. 1400, the Nixon Administration bill for federal criminal law codification in the 93rd
Congress, took
1975). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's recommendations for changes in the criminal
procedure rules see Note, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure, 14
WASHBURN L.J. 76 (1975).
4 S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Section 101 sets out the bill's proposed revision and
codification of Title 18 of the United States Code. Hereinafter citation to "S. 1 § -" in this
article will refer to the designated section of that proposed codification. The quotation
marks contained in section 101 of the bill will be omitted.
I H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
6 S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). Section 101 of this bill sets out its proposed
amendment, revision, and codification of title 18 of the United States Code. Hereinafter
citation to "S. 1400 § -" in this article will refer to the designated section of that proposed
codification. The quotation marks contained in section 101 of the bill will be omitted.
The text of this predecessor may also be found in Hearings, supra note 2, at 4862-5197.
For introductory remarks on S. 1400 see 119 CONG. REC. 9655-58 (1973) (statement of
Senator Hruska).
' The law and order philosophy of the former Administration and its effect on the law
enforcement practices of the Department of Justice are chronicled in Goldfarb, Politicsat the
Justice Department, in CONSPIRACY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HARRISBURG TRIAL FOR THE
DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 105 (J. Raines ed. 1974).
The "law and order" perspective is apparently being continued by President Ford in the
guise of "domestic tranquility." Editorial, 'Domestic Tranquility', N.Y. Times, April 30, 1975, at
40, col. 2 (N.J. ed.). President Ford repeated this theme in his recent message to Congress on
crime. N.Y. Times, June 20, 1975, at 1, col. 8 (N.J. ed.).
8 Cf Reisig, Making the 60's Illegal: Nixon's PoisonousLegacy, Village Voice, May 19, 1975,
at 15, col. 4.
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advantage of everything that confused and frightened Americans in the 1960s-permissiveness, pornography, Dr. Spock, the
Chicago conspiracy, Daniel Ellsberg, Abby Hoffman, pot, LSD,
the SDS, the Weathermen, and more. 9
Much of this is continued in S. 1.
For those who complain that lawbreakers are punished too

leniently, S. 1 would impose a mandatory death penalty for certain
offenses.' 0 The bill would also make parole and probation more
difficult to obtain." For those who fear that too many criminals claim
insanity and get off altogether, S. I would denigrate the insanity
defense in a way which would "ignore the relevance to guilt of moral
responsibility and power of choice."' 2 The bill seeks to deter "people
who are obviously undeterrable. . . . [and] steer unequivocally sick
1 3
people to jail rather than mental hospitals."
Many provisions of the proposed code sharply weaken first
amendment rights. It is what can be done with the breadth of this
proposed legislation that presents such an ominous danger to
our Bill of Rights.
Although the regressive measures of S. 1400 provoked considerable criticism in the extensive hearings held over the course of a
year,1 4 there has been a dismaying paucity of response to the
current proposals contained in S. 1" This article is intended as a
tocsin to alert the bench and bar to just a few of the startling
9 Korn & Craig, Making It All Perfectly Legal, Washington Post, Jan. 20, 1974, § C, at 1,
col. 3. See also Wilkinson, The Era of Libertarian Repression-1948 to 1973: From Congressman to
President, With Substantial Supportfrom the Liberal Establishment, 7 AKRON L. REV. 280 (1974).
I' S. I § 240 1(a). For criticisms of the proposed restoration of capital punishment in the
substantially identical provisions of S. 1400 § 2401(a) see Clark, Prologue to Symposium on
Proposed Federal Criminal Codes, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 817, 824 (1973); Schwartz, The Proposed
Federal Criminal Code, 13 CRIM. L. REP. 3265, 3271 (1973); Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 304;
Comment, CongressionalRebirth of the Death Penalty: Guiding theJury PastFurman v. Georgia, 68
Nw. U.L. REV. 893 (1973).
For the perspective of a federal prosecutor see Connelly, The Proposed Federal Criminal
Codes: A Prosecutor's Point of View, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 826, 835-42 (1973).
"I See S. I §§ 2102-06. For a detailed analysis of the similar provisions of S. 1400 see
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3265-67. Professor Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania
Law School concluded that S. 1400 failed all tests of any sentencing system. He stated: "It is
gratuitously harsh." Id. at 3265.
12 Cf. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3269 (reviewing S. 1400 § 502 which is identical to
S. I
§ 522). Former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark has written that this proposal "would
roll back the insanity defense to the dark ages." Clark, supra note 10, at 824 (footnote
omitted). See also Hearings,supra note 2, at 7004-17 (statement and testimony of Dr. Stanley
L. Portnow, Chairman, Committee on Psychiatry and the Law, American Psychiatric Association); Wilkinson, supra note 10, at 307-08.
13 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3269.
i4 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 5694-5700 (statement of Grant Dillman on behalf

of Sigma Delta Chi of the Joint Media Committee).
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provisions which the Nixon Administration had proposed be
enacted into law and which have been adopted in S. 1 by leading
members of the Senate judiciary committee. The chief backer of
the bill, Senator John L. McClellan, has rallied an impressive list of
co-sponsors for S. 1 that includes both party floor leaders, Senators
Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott, conservatives like Senators James
0. Eastland and Roman L. Hruska, and liberals like Senators Birch
Bayh and Frank E. Moss.
This complex legislation is expected to be pushed through to
passage by its influential sponsors before the 1976 election.' 6 What
have been termed "perfunctory final hearings" were held on the
bill for two days in April 1975 by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. 7 The full committee was
expected to process the new code with a timetable of reaching the
Senate floor in July, with parallel action expected by a House
judiciary subcommittee.'8 As of this writing, both bills are still in
committee.
The proposed code has received considerable support from
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the federal court
system's administrative agency. 9 In the April hearings, the federal
district judge who is chairman of the conference's criminal law
committee stated that S. 1 contained " 'the best thinking of legal
scholars and practicing attorneys' " and had, with some reservations, " 'general approval' " from the federal court system. 20 In
sharp contrast, spokesmen for civil liberties vigorously opposed the
2
bill . 1
The judicial conference did not raise the constitutional issues
See Hentoff, God-and Sid Zion-Save the Republic!, Village Voice, May 26, 1975, at
28, col. 5-29, col. 1.
Only recently, in a lead editorial, did The New York Times express opposition to provisions of S. I that would drastically curtail the freedom of the press to report on government
activities and policies. See Editorial, The Press and S. 1, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1975, at 38, col. 1
(N.J. ed.).
16 Weaver, CriminalCode Revision Near Congress Test, N.Y. Times, April 24, 1975, at 24,
col. 3 (N.J. ed.).
17 Id.
18 Id.
I Id. col. 6.

20 Id. (quoting United States District Court Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli).
11 Id. cols. 5-6. Opposition to S. l's restrictions on freedom of the press was presented
on behalf of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the National
Newspaper Association, the Radio and Television Directors Association, the Association of
American Publishers, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Arnold, ProposedNew Criminal
Code Arouses Press's Fears on Secrecy, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1975, at 69, cols. 6-7 (N.J. ed.).
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discussed in this article. It did not oppose substantive provisions
of the bill such as those that would restore the death penalty and
make it a federal felony to possess or release classified government
information. Instead, it objected to the bill's definitions of criminal
intent, the attempted codification of judicially-created defenses
such as entrapment, and the establishment of appellate review of
22
sentencing.
No single article can deal in detail with a bill of such length, a
bill which contains not only a codification of federal criminal law,
but also of the rules of criminal procedure, a code for the disposition of juvenile and incompetent offenders, and provisions for
amending a large number of diverse criminal statutes to tie them
into the proposed code. At best, one can only do what a geologist
does, and that is to sink test shafts to sample the terrain. The present
article will accordingly deal only with some of the civil liberties issues
which these companion bills present-and which the judicial conference and the sponsors of the proposed legislation appear ready to
ignore.
Even within this limited survey of the proposed code, what
turns up on page after page of S. 1 is chilling in the extreme to
anyone who values American freedoms. The bill emerges as a
turn-back-the-clock blueprint for highly repressive legislation, justified in the name of law and order. It is clearly something far
-more awesome and foreboding than a mere codification of the
federal criminal laws.
THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE PROPOSED CODE

The original impetus for this codification of federal criminal
law came in 1952 when the American Law Institute commenced
work on the planning and drafting of a model penal code. The
chief reporter, Professor Herbert Wechsler, thereafter published a
seminal law review article setting forth the substance of the proposed code. 23 This was followed in 1953 by hearings before the
Senate judiciary committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and
24
Procedures, chaired by Senator John L. McClellan.
In 1966, Congress established the National Commission on
22 Weaver, supra note 16, col. 6.
23

See Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1097 (1952). See

also Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1968).
24 Clark, supra note 10, at 818-19.
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Reform of Federal Criminal Laws to study existing federal criminal
statutes and formulate recommendations for revision and recodification.2 5 This commission was chaired by former governor of
California Edmund C. "Pat" Brown and is popularly known as the
"Brown Commission."
The Commission worked for three years, utilizing as models
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code and the New York
Revised Penal Law. 26 Following submission of earlier drafts to the
legal profession, 27 it eventually adopted a final draft which was
submitted to the President and Congress on January 7, 1971.28
Twelve days of public hearings were then held by Senator McClel29
lan's subcommittee.
From this comprehensive study of the problem of codifying
the federal criminal law came three bills which were considered in
the 93rd Congress.
The version of a proposed federal criminal code sponsored by
the Senate judiciary committee was S. 13" of the 93rd Congressnot to be confused with the bill analyzed in this article, S. 1 of the
94th Congress. The judiciary committee's bill was introduced on
January 4, 1973 by Senator McClellan. 3 1 Having 538 printed
pages, it was then considered the most voluminous bill ever introduced into the Senate.
25 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, 80 Stat. 1516, as amended, Act of July 8,

1969, Pub. L. No. 91-39, 83 Stat. 44.
The Commission was given the responsibility to
make a full and complete review and study of the statutory and case law of the
United States which constitutes the federal system of criminal justice for the purpose of formulating and recommending to the Congress legislation which would
improve the federal system- of criminal justice. It shall be the further duty of the
Commission to make recommendations for revision and recodification of the criminal laws of the United States, including the repeal of unnecessary or undesirable
statutes and such changes in the penalty structure as the Commission may feel will
better serve the ends of justice.
Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-801, § 3, 80 Stat. 1516-17.
26 Clark, supra note 10, at 819. See MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962);
N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967).
27 See Brown & Schwartz, New FederalCode Is Submitted, 56 A.B.A.J. 844,844-45 (1970).
28 NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT [hereinafter

cited as BROWN COMMISSION REPORT], reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 129. See generally
Levine, The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code: A Constitutionaland JurisdictionalAnalysis, 39
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1972); McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: The Challenge of a
Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663; Note, The ProposedFederalPenal Code, 47
N.Y.U.L. REV. 320 (1972).
29 See Hearingson the Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1971-72).
30 S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 2, at 4211.

"' For the introductory remarks of Senator McClellan, who introduced the bill for
himself, Senator Ervin and Senator Hruska see 119 CONG. REC. 989-98 (1973).
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S. 1400 of the 93rd Congress was compiled by the Nixon
Administration and was written in the Department of Justice
headed by former Attorney General John Mitchell. 31 It contained
provisions which are largely identical with many of those now
incorporated into the present bills of the 94th Congress, S. 1 and
H.R. 3907. The Administration bill was introduced on March 27,
1973 by Senator Roman L. Hruska. 3 3 It consisted of 336 pages-to
be contrasted with the 753 pages of S. 1 of the 94th Congress, a
large part of which consists of the addition of proposals for amending the rules of criminal procedure.
The third bill stemming from the work of the Brown Commission was H.R. 10047 of the 93rd Congress, which was introduced
into the House of Representatives on September 5, 1973. 34 H.R.
10047 duplicated the model bill proposed in the Brown Commission report.

35

Submission of S. 1400, the Nixon Administration bill, in 1973
was preceded by a special message sent to Congress, detailing the
President's view of reform and codification. 3 6 This State of the
31 After receiving the Brown Commission's report, President Nixon directed the Attorney General to create a special unit to study and evaluate the proposal. Statement by the
PresidentAfter Receipt of the Report of the National Commission on Reform of FederalCriminal Laws,
7 PRES. Doc. 68-69 (Jan. 16, 1971). See also The President's Memorandum to the Attorney General
Directing Action, 7 PRS. Doc. 69 (Jan. 16, 1971).
11 See 119 CONG. REC. 9655-69 (1973). In introducing the bill for himself and Senator
McClellan, Senator Hruska stated:
S. I represents the diligent and unsparing efforts of Senator MCCLELLAN and
others too numerous to mention. Similarly, [S. 1400] which I introduce today is the
product of extensive and intensive effort by the administration.
Id. at 9656.
"' See id. at 28464 (1973). The bill was introduced by Representatives Kastenmeier and
Edwards. Id.
31 Clark, supra note 10, at 821.
The counterpart of H.R. 10047 in the present Congress is H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975). It was introduced in the House by Representative Kastenmeier for himself and
Representatives Edwards, Eilberg, and Mikva and was referred to the House Committee on
the Judiciary. 121 CONG. REc. H 154 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975).
" Sixth in a Series of Presidential Messages to the Congress on the State of the Union, 9 PRES.
Doc. 259 (March 14, 1973).
In this sixth State of the Union Message, former President Nixon declared:
The decade of the 1960s was characterized in many quarters by a growing sense of
permissiveness in America-as well intentioned as it was poorly reasoned-in which
many people were reluctant to take the steps necessary to control crime. It is no
coincidence that within a few years' time, America experienced a crime wave that
threatened to become uncontrollable.
Id. at 260. And he added:.
These [FBI] statistics and these indices suggest that our anti-crime program is
on the right track. They suggest that we are taking the right measures. They prove
that the only way to attack crime in America is the way crime attacks our peoplewithout pity. Our program is based on this philosophy, and it is working.
Id. at 260-61.
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Union message of March 14, 1973, presented to Congress an outline of the draft code. In the light of what analysis discloses is
contained in S. 1400 as well as its current reincarnation, S. 1 of the
94th Congress, the President's summary of his proposals constituted a notable (and, in retrospect, typical) lack of candor. The
Nixon bill, embodied in the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1973,
was described as a "refinement" of the work done by the bipartisan
Brown Commission. 37 In actuality, although S. 1400-and now S. 1
of the 94th Congress-superficially resembles the majority report
emanating from the Brown Commission, the Nixon Administration
bill was worlds removed from the Brown Commission report in
many aspects, particularly in its repetitious attack upon the Bill of
Rights and in its underlying punitive, rigid approach toward crime
and punishment.
In describing the bill to be offered by his Administration, the
President limited himself to its anti-crime aspects: the harsher scale
of punishment, the mandatory death sentence (also submitted to
Congress in a separate bill 38), and the proposals to eliminate the

insanity defense. 3 9 One of the crucial factors undermining "the
stability of our society," he insisted, was the "growing sense of
permissiveness in America.

40

However, buried in the pages of the Nixon Administration bill
were bold attacks upon first amendment freedoms of the press. If
these measures had been enacted into law, the revelations-which
eventually led to Mr. Nixon's resignation to avoid certain impeachment and probable conviction on the impeachment chargeswould most likely have never occurred. S. 1400 can readily be
understood as part of a persistent Nixon Administration plan to
curtail the freedom of the press and the media and to coerce them
into a type of cowed conformity. That effort failed, and, partly as a
result, the Nixon Administration fell. What is startling is that,
despite all the revelations of Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, My
Lai, the secret war in Cambodia, and all the other proofs of what
lies concealed in the ugly secrets locked up in classified documents,
S. 1 has re-introduced substantially the same provisions that the
Nixon Administration had sought to impose in order to place
hobbles on the freedom of information to the American public.
Id. at 262.
S. 1401, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
31 See Sixth in a Series of PresidentialMessages to the Congress on the State of the Union, 9
PRES. Doc. 259, 263-65 (March 14, 1973).
40 Id. at 260.
37

'8
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THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT

The lessons of Watergate appear to have been essentially lost
upon those who are sponsoring the harsh, regressive legislation
incorporated into S. 1. If Watergate has any meaning at all, it is
that a vigilant, unintimidated press and a corps of competent
investigative reporters, which uncovered proof of high crimes
and misdemeanors on the part of former President Richard M.
Nixon, various members of his cabinet, and a number of his top
aides, are vital to the functioning of our democratic society. It is
not at all surprising that S. 1400, the predecessor bill of S. 1,
sought to protect arbitrarily classified information and to make its
disclosure a federal felony. 4 ' What is indeed surprising, however, is
that in post-Watergate legislation this self-serving zeal to protect
government "secrets" should reappear with the support of leading
members of the Senate.
There has never been an Official Secrets Act in this country to
parallel that in Great Britain. 4 2 The failure of the Government to
secure the conviction of Daniel Ellsberg 4 3 and other events involved in the publication of the Pentagon Papers 4 4 have been seen
as an impetus to such legislation.4 5 Interlocking provisions of S. 1,
substantially identical to those in the Nixon Administration bill,
deal with communicating or disclosing national defense information, mishandling such information, and disclosing classified information.4 6 In all, S. 1 has eight sections which directly affect
public access to government information. 47 The similar provisions
41 S. 1400 § 1124. This proposal would have denied a defense "that the classified
information was improperly classified at the time of its classification or at the time of the
offense." Id. § 1124(d).
42

See, e.g., Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28. See also Kalijarvi & Wallace,

Executive Authority to Impose Prior Restraint upon Publication of Information Concerning National
Security Affairs: A ConstitutionalPower, 9 CALIF. W.L. REV. 468, 470-71 n. Il (1973); Smythe,
Britain's Civil Liberties-An Official Secret, 1 Civ. LIB. REV. 162 (1973).
41 United States v. Russo, Criminal No. 9373-CD (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 29, 1971),

dismissed, (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1973). The events involved in the Ellsberg-Russo trial are
reported in P. SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY: DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE RITUALS OF SECRET
GOVERNMENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as P. SCHRAG].
" New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (injunction against
publication denied).
" Geyelin, Kraslow, Otten, Small & Wicker, Where we stand: a Washington view, 10
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 27, 28 (Sept./Oct. 1971); Rubin, Foreign Policy, Secrecy, And The First

Amendment: The Pentagon Papers In Retrospect, 17 How. L.J. 579, 606 (1972); cf. Wilkinson,
supra note 10, at 305.
"

Compare S. 1 §§ 1121-25 with S. 1400 §§ 1121-25.

See S. I §§ 1121 (espionage), 1122 (disclosing national defense information), 1123
(mishandling national defense information), 1124 (disclosing classified information), 1301
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in S. 1400 became known as the "Nixon 'Official Secrets Act.' "48
These provisions of S. 1 and S. 1400 seem to constitute a sweeping
plan for censorship of the press that critics have concluded "would
be more damaging than the infamous 'Alien and Sedition Laws'
denounced by Thomas Jefferson. ' '4 9 Representatives of the media
vigorously testified in opposition to S. 1400 at the Senate hearings
50
in the 93rd Congress.
Although no one can quarrel with the propriety of safeguarding such information as troop movements and cryptographic
codes, it remains true that
decades of the cold war and undeclared wars have gradually
transformed the initially limited concept of military information
into a blanket of secrecy broad enough to cover a vast area of
government information
essential to self-governing citizens of a
51
democratic society.
The proposals of S. 1 contain not only undesirable but also
unconstitutional threats to the freedom of the press. So far does
the drastic interference with first amendment freedoms go that the
proposed code, if enacted, could lead to the death penalty for such
investigative reporters as Jack Anderson, Seymour Hirsch, Bob
Woodward, and Carl Bernstein if their disclosures of government
secrets occurred in wartime or a national emergency. 5 2 The use of
(obstructing a government function by fraud), 1731 (theft), 1733 (receiving stolen property),
1744 (criminal issuance of a written instrument).
48 Criley, Sneaking up on the Press: Nixon's "Official Secrets Act," 218 THE NATION 265, 265
(1974).
41 Id. For an examination of the press' experience under these early laws see Berns,
Freedom of the Press and the Alien and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sop. CT. REV. 109.
" Among the media represented were the Association of American Publishers, the
Columbia Broadcasting System, the American Library Association, the National Broadcasting Company, the Radio Television News Directors Association, and the American Broadcasting Companies. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 5702-06, 5713-23, 5745-56, 5759-63,
5767-69, 5769-72, 5774-77.
1' Criley, supra note 48, at 265. Accord, Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to
Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 275-76 (1971).
For a sharp criticism of the Official Secrets Act provisions of S. 1 see Wicker, Secrecy
Triumphant, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1975, at 33, cols. 5-6.
52 See S. I §§ 1121(b)(1)(A), 2401(a)(l). Others have reached the identical conclusion. A
former member of the Brown Commission stated that the provisions relating to espionage
and defense information contained in S. 1400 "would be extremely dangerous." He further
testified: "I can envision a situation where a newspaperman could be tried for espionage and
sentenced to death the way that language is written." Hearings, supra note 2, at 5690
(statement of Hon. Abner J. Mikva). A member of the faculty of Columbia University Law
School advised the Senate subcommittee on the danger of the proposal:
The statute defines a "communication" in section 1126(c) to include "publication." Turning to the basic espionage section, which is section 1121, it prohibits
culpable communication of national defense information to a foreign power with
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a conspiracy count could also allow punishment of editors and
publishers.
The press has, of course, no first amendment right to commit
espionage. 5 3 However, it is axiomatic "that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '"54 These issues include military and foreign policy.5 5 The Supreme Court has not
faced the questions presented by the proposed legislation, but it is
clear that the mere label of national security cannot foreclose first
amendment scrutiny of an abridgment of the freedom of the
56
press.
Since there has been no prosecution of the press under the
espionage laws, 5 7 the precedents in this area all deal with private
persons not engaged in the process of informing the public. The
the knowledge that it may be communicated to that foreign power and be helpful to
them.
Since communication is defined so broadly, the statute as it now stands would
make publications of national defense information class A espionage, full-scale
espionage, and a class A felony. And, indeed, under S. 1400's capital penalty
provisions, it is at least theoretically possible that the person could get the death
sentence. Now I can't believe that the draftsmen contemplated that the death
penalty would be the ordinary result of newspaper publication. But it does seem to
me that this law makes it, at least, possible.
Id. at 7122 (statement of Prof. Harold Edgar).
The threats to the press from the existing espionage statutes as well as the proposals of
S. 1400 are comprehensively examined in Edgar & Schmidt, The Espionage Statutes and
Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973).
11 Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 591 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838
(1952).
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Regarding the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Justice Black stated:
In revealing the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted they would
do.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
5.6See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) where Justice Brennan
stated:
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the repression
of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.
(Footnotes omitted.) See also United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 320-21
(1972) (claim of national security cannot preclude application of fourth amendment standards).
11 In their exhaustive study of espionage statutes, Professors Edgar and Schmidt conclude:
No prosecution premised on publication has ever been brought under the espionage laws, even though numerous opportunities have been presented. Moreover, the
prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for unlawful retention of defense
information under [18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1970)] was the first effort to apply the espionage statutes to conduct preparatory to publication.
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at 937.
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principles developed in these cases may not be fully applicable to
the press. While the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times
Co. v. United States5 8 enters the realm of the press and governmental secrecy, it is within the context of an injunction, not a criminal
prosecution. The impact of this decision on S. l's Official Secrets
Act is reserved for later discussion.
Espionage

S. 1 carries on an expansive definition of "national defense
information" which had marked its Nixon Administration predecessor. 5 9 The ten categories of "national defense information" include
not only the entirely defensible military and atomic energy subjects60
but also such vague concepts as "intelligence operations, activities,
plans. estimates, analyses, sources, or methods, of the United
States" 61 and the completely open-ended provision for "in time of
war, any other matter involving the security of the United States that
might be useful to the enemy. '6 2 Three sections of S. 1 punish the
' 63
unauthorized communication of "national defense information,
'"64
while a fourth forbids disclosure of "classified information.
The maximum offense for communicating national defense
information is espionage. 65 These provisions punish a person
if, knowing that national defense information may be used to the
prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or to the
advantage of a foreign power, he:
(1) communicates such information to a foreign power;
(2) obtains or collects such information, knowing that it
may be communicated to a foreign power; or
(3) enters a restricted area with intent to obtain or collect
such information,
knowing that it may be communicated to a
66
foreign power.

S. 1 defines "communicate" as "to impart or transfer information, or
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Compare S. I § 1128(f) with S. 1400 § 1126(g).
60 S. 1 §§ 1128(f)(1)-(5), (8)-(9).
6- Id. § 1128(0(6).
62 Id. § 1128(f)(10).
63 Id. §§ 1121-23.
"' Id. § 1124. Classified information is broadly defined as
any information, regardless of its origin, that is marked or designated pursuant to the
provisions of a statute or an executive order, or a regulation or rule issued pursuant
thereto, as information requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized
disclosure for reasons of national security . ...
Id. § 1128(b). This is substantively identical to the wording of S. 1400 § 1126(b).
65 S. 1 § 1121.
00

Id. § 1121(a) (emphasis added).
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otherwise to make information available by any means, to a person or
to the general public. '6 7 Thus, with the inclusion of knowledge that
the information "may be used," the crime of espionage, normally
thought of as involving spies and agents of a foreign power, becomes
a means of censorship of press publication of official secrets. Publication of the Pentagon Papers would come within the scope of this
section, "since it is a fair presumption that The New York68Times 'may
be' read by officials in Peking, Moscow and Havana.
Although an expansive concept of national defense information
in existing law has been upheld against a vagueness challenge,6 9 the
Court based its determination on a requirement that the defendants
"have acted in bad faith.

'70

This scienter was met by

"intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained isto

be used to the injury
of the United States, or to the advantage of any
7
foreign nation." '

While S. 1 may appear to resemble the existing culpability provision, the distinction between "isto be used" and the proposed
67 Id. § I i. The same definition of the term had been used in the Nixon Administration
bill. S. 1400 § 1126(c). However, this proposal had placed the definition in its chapter on
national security offenses, unlike S. I which has the term's definition far removed and contained
in the general definitions section of the proposed code.
"s Criley, supra note 48, at 265. Accord, Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at 1082 & n.43 1.
69 In Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941), the Supreme Court was faced with
determining what constituted "information relating to national defense." Quoting the Government, it approved a definition of national defense as " 'a generic concept of broad
connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities of
national preparedness.' "Id. at 28. The relationship to defense " 'must not be a strained one nor
an arbitrary one' " but rather " 'must be reasonableand direct.' "Id. at 31 (quoting from the
lower court's instructions to the jury). The determination of this relationship was for the jury,
not a government official. Id. at 33.
Subsequent lower court decisions added to this framework. Governmental classification of
the information as defense-related was not conclusive. United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d
132, 152 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1013 (1966). Furthermore, information that had
been made public, was not restricted by the Government, or was easily accessible from
non-governmental sources was not within the scope of the espionage laws. United States v.
Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946).
The Gorin standard for national defense information is subjected to critical analysis in
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at 974-86. See also Bank, Espionage: The American Judicial
Response: An in Depth Analysis of the Espionage Laws and Related Statutes, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 329,
341-46 (1972); Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the
Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311, 330-31 (1974).
70 Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941).
71 Id. at 27-28 (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1970)) (emphasis added). This element of
culpability is phrased in the disjunctive. If there is benefit to a foreign nation, injury to the
United States does not matter. See id. at 29-30. See also United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813,815
(2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833 (1946). The injury or advantage test is examined in
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at 987-89.
72 Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(a)-(b), 794(a) (1970) with S. 1 § 1121(a).
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"may be used" is monumental. The present statute may be construed to exclude a reporter's activities by focusing upon his belief
that the "primary use" of the information is to enlighten the public
-not to injure or advantage any nation-state. 73 This construction
is not possible with the broader language of S. 1.
The chilling effect of this section, particularly in wartime, is
clear and grim. The redefined crime of espionage is one of four
categories of offenses termed a class A felony for which there may
be a mandatory death sentence. 74 In peacetime and where the
disclosures of national defense information are considered less
sensitive, conviction is a class B felony 75 for which the maximum
76
punishment is thirty years imprisonment.
Disclosing National Defense Information
An espionage law of a lesser degree punishes a person
if, knowing that national defense information may be used to the
prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or to the
advantage of a foreign power, he communicates such informa77
tion to a person who he knows is not authorized to receive it.
This section has been notably rewritten from its prior version
in S. 1400 which had simply provided that "[a] person is guilty of
an offense if he knowingly communicates information relating to
78
the national defense to a person not authorized to receive it."
With this earlier language, the section plainly covered the news
story revealing an Administration decision to favor Pakistan in its
war with India. 79 The present language, despite the change, still
73 Edgar & Schmidt, supranote 52, at 998.

7' See S. I §§ 1121 (b)(1), 2401 (a)(1). The conditions for imposition of the death penalty are
if
(A) the defendant has been convicted of another offense involving treason,
sabotage, or espionage, committed before the time of the offense, for which a sentence
of life imprisonment or death was authorized;
(B) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave
risk of substantial impairment of the national defense; or
(C) the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave
risk of death to any person ....
Id. § 2401(a)(1).
_ Id. § 1121(b)(2).
16 Id. § 2301(b)(2). A fine of up to $100,000 is also authorized. Id. § 2201(b)(1)(A).
Ild. § 1122(a).
s S. 1400 § 1122(a). Regarding the rewriting of this section see notes 91-92 infra and
accompanying text.
'9 See Criley, supra note 48, at 265. See generally J. ANDERSON, THE ANDERSON PAPERS
253-326 (1974). A strong argument can be made that matters of international diplomacy and
foreign relations are beyond the scope of espionage laws because they do not directly affect
national defense. Bank, supra note 69, at 345-46. But see New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 762-63 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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seems broad and vague enough to make the publication of such a
story a criminal offense."0
The same defect in the "may be used" phrasing of the espionage section is present here. A policy of non-disclosure and
governmental secrecy is certainly encouraged by this standard.
However, as one commentator has observed:
It may be because "over-concealment" is rampant that Congress
seems to have aimed criminal penalties to enforce classification
essentially-perhaps exclusively-at purposeful disclosure "with
intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation."'"
Mishandling National Defense Information

Both public officials and employees "in authorized possession
or control" and persons "in unauthorized possession or control of
national defense information" may be punished for "engag[ing] in
conduct that causes its loss, destruction, or theft, or its communication to [a] person who is not authorized to receive it." 82 The
significance of the term "theft" will be analyzed below. This section
would also punish a person who "fails to deliver [the information]
83
promptly to a federal public servant who is entitled to receive it."

If these provisions are enacted, it will provide a basis for imposing
criminal sanctions upon both the public official who leaks national
defense information and the reporter or other person who possesses it.
This section of S. 1 would have allowed the Government to
4
prevail in its prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.
The indictment charged Ellsberg with "having lawful and unauthorized possession" of national defense information which they
"communicate[d] .. . to . . . a person not entitled to receive" the

I" The offense is punished as a class C felony during wartime or a national defense
emergency with up to fifteen years imprisonment. See S. I §§ 1122(b)(1), 2301(b)(3). It is a
class D felony in any other situation. Id. § II 22(b)(2). The punishment then is seven years in
prison. Id. § 2301(b)(4). Fines of up to $100,000 may be assessed in either situation. Id.
§ 2201(b)(l)(A).
s Henkin,supra note 51, at 276 (footnote omitted) (quoting from 18 U.S.C. § 794 (1970)).
82 S. 1 §§ 1123(a)(i)(A), (a)(2)(A).
83 Id. § 1123(a)(2)(B). Regarding the substantially equivalent provision for one in authorized possession, the bill punishes a person who "intentionally fails to deliver it on
demand to a federal public servant who is authorized to demand it." Id. § 1123(a)(1)(C).
There is also a provision for failure "to report promptly . . . loss, destruction, or theft, or...
communication" of defense information. Id. § 1123(a)(1)(B). S. I is substantially identical to
the provisions of S. 1400 § 1123.
84 United States v. Russo, Criminal No. 9373-CD (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 29, 1971),
dismissed, (C.D. Cal., May 11, 1973).
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It also alleged that "having unauthorized possession"

of the information, the defendants "retain[ed] .

.

. and fail[ed] to

deliver" it to a proper federal official.8 6 There was no allegation of
harm to the United States or benefit to another nation. The indictment thus closely resembles the S. 1 proposal. Both the indictment
8 7
and the mishandling section of S. 1 are constitutionally defective.
The mishandling section differs in material respects from the
provisions dealing with espionage and disclosure of national defense information. Each of these sections includes the important
condition precedent of scienter: the person charged with the offense must have knowledge that the "information may be used to
the prejudice of the safety or interest of the United States, or to the

advantage of a foreign power.

'8 8

A similar provision appears in the

8 9

current statute. However, no corresponding language to this effect appears in this section or in the overlapping section covering
disclosure of classified information.9" Unless these terms are to be
read into the proposals, the specific intent to injure or benefit need
not be proved by the Government.
In sharply questioning the Department of Justice spokesman
during hearings on S. 1400, Senator Hart noted that the language
then contained in the disclosure of national defense information
provision did not call for a condition precedent of scienter. 9 1
Senator Hart pointedly asked:
Would it not be desirable that . . . there be available to the
85 P. SCHRAG, supra note 43, at 391-92. The indictment is reproduced in an appendix to
Mr. Schrag's book. The Government alleged these acts were in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 793(d), (e) (1970). It also filed charges of violations of section 793(c) which depended upon
finding a violation of subsections (d) and (e). The indictment also contained counts alleging
theft offenses. See P. SCH RAG, supra at 383, 390-91.
86 P. SCI RAG, supra note 43, at 392-95.
87 The constitutionality of the Ellsberg indictment was not reached because of the
dismissal. However, the constitutional validity of the charges of communicating and retaining documents relating to the national defense is examined and rejected in Nimmer, supra
note 69, at 324-27.
88 S. 1
§ 1121(a), 1122(a).
89 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), (e) (1970) provide in pertinent part:
[I]nformation relating to the national defense which information the possessor has
reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation ....
This is not the clause under which Ellsberg and Russo were indicted. They were charged with
communicating "document[s] . . . relating to the national defense." There is no scienter
requirement for this clause. Nimmer, supra note 69, at 324; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), (e). The
culpability standards of these provisions are examined in Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at
1038-50.
90 S. 1 § 1124.
9' See Hearings, supra note 2, at 5473. S. 1400 § 1122 had simply provided that "[a]
person is guilty of an offense if he knowingly communicates information relating to the
national defense to a person not authorized to receive it."
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defendant expressly the right to show that it didn't hurt the
country, the national defense, the national security?9 2
Presumably in response to such criticism, the language of the
disclosure section has been modified in the present S. 1 but without
a corresponding requirement for scienter in the mishandling and
classified information provisions. At the minimum, this deliberate
omission makes it easier for the Department of Justice to secure a
conviction of either a present or former federal employee or the
recipient of national defense information under the mishandling
section than under the disclosure provision-let alone the espionage statute. The Government then has no burden to show that the
result of the communication is or was in any respect harmful to the
nation.
The section also seems intended to overcome Judge Learned
Hand's requirement that there be an affirmative effort on the part
of the Government to prevent dissemination of national defense
information. 9 3 In the absence of such restriction, collection of
material from lawfully accessible sources and its communication
within the United States could not be illegal. Transmission of the
94
information abroad in peacetime also could not be prohibited.
Both S. 1400 and S. 1 represent a vigorous, determined effort
to provide a statutory basis to enable the Government to prevent
dissemination of defense information. However, the deliberate
omission of the crucial scienter language results in unconstitutional
vagueness and overbreadth. In Gorin v. United States,9 5 a sweeping
concept of national defense information was sustained only because of the scienter requirement. 9 6 In the absence of such intent
to harm the United States or benefit another nation, the offense
was susceptible of numerous meanings. 97 Unconstitutional overbreadth results since without the limiting of the intent requirement
any form of expression at all becomes subject to criminal sanction.
Tested by these constitutional standards, this section of S. 1 fails.
Disclosing Classified Information
Our present espionage laws and the Government's system of
classifying documents are linked together for the first time by the
provisions of S. 1 which would punish a person
92 Hearings,supra note 2, at 5474. His misgivings were shared by Senator Cook. See id. at

5476-77.
9' See United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 833
(1946).
9' See id.
312 U.S. 19 (1941).
9I Id. at 26-28. See note 69 supra.
9 312 U.S. at 26.
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if, being or having been in authorized possession or control of
classified information, or having obtained such information as a
result of his being or having been a federal public servant, he
communicates such information
to a person who is not au98
thorized to receive it.
At present, no statute expressly authorizes the classification of

documents containing "defense information." This has been
achieved by executive order. Inferentially, the approval of Congress can be spelled out in some statutes which recognize the
existence of such executive classificatory action.9 9 Similarly, there is

no statute criminally punishing the disclosure of classified information unless it is communicated to a foreign agent or a member of a
communist organization.""' Consequently, sanctions for violations
of the classification system have been limited to administrative
discipline." Moreover, the Ellsberg case demonstrates that in a
prosecution under the espionage laws for disclosure of classified
defense information the Government must prove that the disclosure was prejudicial to national security, either injuring the United
0 2
States or providing an advantage to a foreign nation.1
98 S. 1 § 1124(a).
99 This area is comprehensively examined in Developments in the Law-The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1189-1207 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Developments-National Security].
100 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1970).
101 Developments-National Security, supra note 99, at 1206.
102 Nimmer, supra note 69, at 325. The nearly identical language of S. 1400's disclosure

of classified information section has been examined in light of the rulings in the Ellsberg
trial by Professor Nesson of the Harvard Law School. See Nesson, A Step Toward an Autocratic
State, TRIAL, Sept./Oct. 1973, at 27. He concluded that S. 1400's Official Secrets Act,
although "at least an honest bid for Executive power," was "more than unwise; it is unconstitutional." Id. at 28. On the issue of harm to national security interests, Professor Nesson
observed:
The prosecution sought to prove that the Pentagon Papers "related to the
national defense" by showing simply that they dealt with the war in Vietnam. This
term, "related to national defense," became a major constitutional battleground in
the pre-trial and trial arguments. Ellsberg argued that under the First Amendment
no person's right to speak and communicate with the Congress or the electorate at
large can be abridged by the government without good reason. Therefore, unless at
the time of the disclosure there was some then current legitimate secret, Ellsberg's
disclosure of them could not be criminal under the Constitution. This implied that
"related to national defense" had to mean something more than superficial connection
with military matters. To be constitutional it had to mean "relating to national defense
in a manner which justifies secrecy."
• . . [T]he trial judge ruled in Ellsberg's favor; proof of "relation to national
defense" required a showing that disclosure of the Pentagon Papers could injure the
national defense of the United States or aid a foreign power.
The prosecution made but a feeble attempt on this score, offering the vaguest
generalities from two retired generals and one active diplomat. Ellsberg, for his
part, called to the stand a spectrum of national security experts ranging from
McGeorge Bundy to Tom Hayden. Each analysed a section of the Pentagon Papers
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If enacted, this section of S. 1 would solve the legal problem
for the Government. The scienter requirement of the espionage
statutes, necessary to prevent overbreadth and vagueness in dealing with "national defense information," is not present. The proposal is basically a reenactment of the statute forbidding communication of classified information to foreign agents but without its
limitation as to recipients. However, even that statute has a scienter
element of" 'knowing or having reason to know that such information has been so classified.' 1103 The S. 1 proposal apparently requires no more than that the defendant know that he is engaged in
10 4
conduct that communicates something.
In Scarbeck v. United States, 10 5 the leading case on classified
disclosures to foreign powers, the District of Columbia Circuit held
that improper classification was no defense to prosecution. 1 6 Unlike
a charge under the espionage laws, the court ruled that the Government had no burden to convince the jury that the information was
related to national defense. 107 S.1400 followed Scarbeck by denying in
sweeping fashion any defense that would challenge the classification:
It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the
classified information was improperly classified at the time of its
classification or at the time of the offense.' 08
However, the Scarbeck rationale for denying the defense is
unsatisfactory. The court accepted the Supreme Court's requirement
in detail and could find no justification for their continued secrecy. Post-trial
interviews with the jurors showed that not a single one had thought that the
continued secrecy of the Pentagon Papers had been justified, their "Top Secret"
classification, to the contrary, not withstanding.
The proposed official secrets act explicitly provides that the continuing propriety of a secrecy classification at the time of disclosure cannot be questioned, thus
making it irrelevant whether disclosure of a document could in any way injure the
national security of the United States. This runs head on into the First Amendment
principle which led the Ellsberg trial judge to construe "relation to national defense" so as to require that the disclosure involve some potential injury to the
national security interests.
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
103 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1970) construed in Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546, 556
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
'"' Since no state of mind is specifically required in this section, reference must be made
to the code's general provision on culpability. Compare S. I § 1124(a) with id. § 303(b). The
latter section requires that the forbidden "conduct [be] 'knowing.'" Id. § 303(b). "Knowing"
is in turn defined in section 302.
'0 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963).
317 F.2d at 558.
107 Id. at 559.
108 S. 1400 § 1124(d). The Administration's reliance on Scarbeck was brought out in the
lOS

Senate hearings by Kevin T. Maroney, the Justice Department spokesman. Hearings, supra
note 2, at 5466-67. Mr. Maroney had argued Scarbeck for the Government.
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in Gorin of proof of a reasonable and direct relationship to national
defense for espionage prosecution, but found that it was inapplicable
to classified disclosures.' 0 9 The prohibition of such disclosures, the
court reasoned, was only directed "at a small group-employees of
the Federal Government."' 0 The difficulty with this justification is
that the Government does not in fact employ a limited number of
people. 1'Consequently, numerous persons are denied the protection deemed essential in the almost indistinguishable provisions
12
examined in Gorin."
Another reason for denying an improper classification defense is
that allowing an inquiry into the relationship of the information to
national defense would require the Government to "disclose the
information" that had been classified, thus undermining the classification system." 3 The argument is circular, especially when disclosure is to the press which has published it. The inadequacy of this
purported justification is underscored by contrasting a prosecution
for communicating the same classified national defense information
under the espionage statute. That the information is defense information, and hence subject to classification, is not determined by the
14
fact of classification."
S. 1400's preclusion of an improper classification defense was
criticized both in the hearings and by commentators." 5 There has
109317 F.2d at 559. For a discussion of this aspect of Gorin see note 69 supra.
110 317 F.2d at 559.

"' Bank, supra note 69, at 364.
112 Id.

1'3 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5467 (statement of U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Kevin T. Maroney).
14 See United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 151 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 1013 (1966).
"5 See, e.g., Hearings,supra note 2, at 5482-84 (statement of Senator Hart); id. at 5706
(statement of Heather Florence on behalf of the Association of American Publishers).
Testifying with respect to the language of section 1124 contained in S. 1400, William G.
Florence, an expert on national defense information who had served as consultant to
defense counsel in the Ellsberg case, advised the subcommittee:
Section 1124 would be especially repressive regarding disclosure of what is
called "classified information." People would be criminalized solely because somebody put a classification marking of confidential, secret or top secret on an item of
information. A person accused of revealing the information would be prohibited
from challenging the validity of the classification.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Justice suggestion that a security classification marking would identify information as affecting the national defense is truly a
hoax. The designation of an item of information as being classified is strictly a
matter of mind. Anyone can say that some information is classified secret at a given
moment, and then change his mind at any time thereafter and reveal the information without restriction. But any document containing the information normally will
keep the original classification marking, even after complete disclosure of the
information.
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been a modification of the language for the S. 1 version. Instead of
an automatic absolute preclusion of the defense, S. 1 provides a
labyrinthine requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
An affirmative defense is available to the defendant if he tried to
secure declassification and had exhausted the section's review procedure i t 6 and if the information
(A) was not communicated to an agent of a foreign power;
(B) was not communicated in exchange for anything of of [sic]
value; and
(C) was not lawfully subject to classification at the time of the
offense."'I
Communication to a foreign agent must be construed to mean
intentional and purposeful communication rather than the transfer
of information coincidentally through a news report. Unless the
provision has this meaning, the conjunctive structure of this section
will always bar the defense where there is a leak to the press even if the
other requirements are met. t t 8
Id. at 6902. In his prepared statement, Mr. Florence pointed out that at the time he was
testifying, available statistics showed that more than 1.7 billion "pages of historical records
under National Archives jurisdiction [were] designated as being 'classified.' That would be a
file of papers almost 60 miles long." Id. at 6918 (emphasis in original).
How far this section would go in preventing access to facts the public has the right to
know, despite the continuing mania of government bureaucrats to classify information as
secret, is spelled out, not only in Mr. Florence's testimony and prepared statement, but also
by one commentator's observation:
Section 1124 locks the door to any public knowledge of the content of the
millions of classified documents in government archives until such time as an
administration may decide to reveal them. Under previous administrations, the
penchant for secrecy reached the absurdity of classifying documents on the flight of
migratory birds, and the use of the bow and arrow (an Army Ordnance report on
"silent, flashless weapons"). At present, 16,238 federal employees in forty-seven
executive departments and agencies are authorized to classify documents. Section
1124 would be a license for the government to classify anything and everything it
pleased.
Criley, supra note 48, at 266. See also Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 52, at 1084; Schwartz,
supra note 10, at 3271-72; Comment, Civil Liberties and National Security: A DelicateBalance, 68
Nw. U.L. REv. 922, 935-41 (1973).
116 S. I § 1124(d)(2). This review procedure requires the establishment of
(A) a government agency responsible for insuring that other government
agencies classify and maintain as classified only such information as is lawfully
subject to classification; and
(B) a review procedure through which the defendant could obtain review, by
the government agency described in subparagraph (A), of the lawfulness of the
classification of the information . ...
Id. § 1124(c)(1).
,I7 Id. § 1124(d)(2).
18 There are two other difficulties in these three criteria. The first results from
subparagraph (B)'s requirement that the disclosure not be "in exchange for anything of
value." S. l's general definitions section defines "anything of value" as
any direct or indirect gain or advantage, or anything that might reasonably be
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Unless the defendant exhausts the review procedure and meets
the three other criteria, S. 1-like S. 1400-provides that "[i]t is not a
defense.. . that the information was not lawfully subject to classification."" 9 However, this provision conflicts with the constitutional
principle of judicial review. 2 °
S. 1 contains the laudable addition barring prosecution for
disclosure unless
prior to the return of the indictment . . . the head of the

government agency classifying the information, the head of the
government agency [charged with supervising proper classification by other agencies], and the Attorney General jointly certify
to the court that the information was
lawfully subject to classifica2
tion at the time of the offense.' 1
There is, however, a superficial simplistic appeal involved in
this device of certification by three Government officials. The problem here is the familiar one of "Quis custodes custodiet?"-freely
regardedby the beneficiary as a direct or indirect gain or advantage, including a direct
or indirect gain or advantage to any other person ....
Id. § 111 (emphasis added). A not necessarily ad absurdum reading of this definition might
preclude a Daniel Ellsberg from an improper classification defense. Ellsberg's disclosure was
prompted by his conscience ("an indirect gain"?) and for the purpose of informing the
American public ("gain or advantage to . . . other person[s]"?).
The second problem is with subparagraph (C) and results from the interrelationship of
subsections (d) and (e). No defense of improper classification is available under subsection
(e) unless-as determined in subsection (d)-the classified information was improperly
classified. Compare id. § 1124(e) with id. § 1 124(d)(2). Information that is determined to be no
longer properly classified may be subject to automatic declassification. See DevelopmentsNational Security, supra note 99, at 1202-05. If the information is no longer classified because
of administrative procedures prior to disclosure, then no offense can be committed and the
defense provisions are meaningless. However, these subsections may be designed to require
an offer of proof before presenting evidence to the jury which will ultimately decide
whether the information "was not lawfully subject to classification."
119 S. I § 1124(e).
120 This was the conclusion of one commentator examining the identical provision in S.
1400 in light of rulings made in the Ellsberg-Russo trial. See Nesson, supra note 102, at 28,
30. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 5718-19 (Statement of Association of American
Publishers Inc.); Developments-NationalSecurity, supra note 99, at 1219-21. After examining
the relationship of judicial scrutiny and executive secrecy, the editors of the Harvard Law
Review concluded:
Besides the need to preserve a balance of power among the branches of the
Government, there is another reason for the judiciary to make the final determination as to whether withholding is permissible: the need to ensure that the public is
informed about the activities of its Government. The right of the public to know
what the Government is doing, consistent with legitimate considerations of national
security and administrative efficiency, is essential to our democratic system of
government. This premise, implicit in the first amendment policy of promoting the
broadest possible debate on issues of public importance, reinforces the case against
absolute executive privilege.
Id. at 1221 (footnotes omitted).
121 S. 1 § 1124(c)(2).
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translated as "Who is going to certify the certifiers?" The rueful
realization that the persons doing either the classifying or investigating in the Government may have neither the best of motives
nor the most objective of approaches took on new dimensions as
the full scope of the massive coverup in the events generically
known as Watergate became known through the work of investigative reporters and congressional hearings. What S. 1 demands of a
court is that it accept on faith a certification of these Government
officials-themselves political appointees-that the information
"was lawfully subject to classification." To the theologian, faith may
indeed move mountains, but an entirely different issue, of grave
constitutional dimensions, is presented when that same faith is
offered as grounds for instituting proceedings that may sanction
criminal penalties for a present or former public official who seeks
1 22
to inform the public of the activities of its Government.
Theft of Government Property and Receiving Stolen Property

Far less obvious in their potential impact on press and media
freedom to pierce government secrecy as to matters pertaining to
military and foreign policy, as well as those that have been arbitrarily classified, are the provisions of the proposed code which deal
with theft123 and the companion section on receiving stolen prop-

erty. "2' 4 That these sections intertwine with the other provisions of
the Official Secrets Act is shown by the repeated references to
122

The danger of undue deference to executive judgment and power has been pointed

Out:
One of the reasons that eternal vigilance is necessary for the preservation of
our liberties is that government officials are all too likely to yield to the natural
tendency to equate criticism with subversion and to assume and even proclaim that
every expression of opposition is the result of a plot, domestic or foreign. Our
liberties are in danger whenever we are told, as we have been told repeatedly, that
public expression of disagreement with government policies undermines the strength
of this nation in its dealings with the rest of the world.
We must make sure that we safeguard ourselves against abuses by any government which embraces that illusion. It is that illusion which results in secrecy to the
point of paranoia and, ultimately, to wholesale wiretapping and eavesdropping,
burglary and other crimes when other methods of silencing criticism fail.
The pending legislation would assure any government in power and all of its
subordinate officials that any document which they designate, rightly or wrongly, as
secret will remain secret until they choose to bring it to the light. The protection
against leaks would be virtually watertight since criminal sanctions could be imposed not only on the persons who give the information to the press but on the
press itself. In effect, the press would be unable to publish any government document which the government wishes to keep to itself.
Congress has rejected such proposals in the past. It should do so again now.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 5780-81 (Statement of the American Jewish Congress).
123 S. I § 1731.
124 Id. § 1733.
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"theft" of defense information in the "mishandling national de2 5
fense information" section.'
These provisions may or may not be innocuous depending
upon how the Justice Department, and eventually the courts,
handle the question, already raised in the Ellsberg trial, of whether
the Government has a property right in intellectual property and
information. There is the further issue whether actions can be
brought for theft or receiving stolen property in factual situations
where classified or other governmental information is leaked to
unauthorized news media or is otherwise communicated or disclosed
1 26
without official sanctions.
On its face, the theft provision of S. 1 appears harmless and
noncontroversial:
A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains or uses the property of
another with intent:
(1) to deprive the other of a right to the property or a
benefit of the property; or
the property to his own use or to the use
(2) to appropriate
12 7
of another person.

Federal jurisdiction exists if "the property is owned by, or is under
the care, custody, or control of, the United States.
25 See id. §§ 1123(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2)(A).

'26

'1 28

The compan-

The counts of the Ellsberg indictment charging theft offenses may be found in P.

SCHRAG, supra note 43, at 385-89. The propriety of these charges is examined in Nimmer,

supra note 69, at 315-24.
Representatives of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press addressed this
issue in the hearings on S. 1400:
There are dozens of important cases which uphold the doctrine that the
government can have no proprietary ownership interests in government reports
.* . In addition, there is the strong line of cases defending the public's right to be
informed of news. This is a right, even more important than the personal right of a
public official to be protected from defamation-certainly a more ancient and
strongly rooted right than the right of the government to own information ....
Then, there is the specific right to republish government information contained in the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. Sec. I et seq. which provides: "No
copyright shall subsist in any publication of the United States government, or any
reprint in whole or in part thereof."
We respectfully suggest that the Department of Justice bill-permitting a criminal prosecution against a newsman for republication of a government document
based on a claim of government ownership-would completely void the 1909
Copyright Act. Certainly the freedom which the Copyright Act gives the press to
republish government information is a meaningless right if a newspaper can be
criminally prosecuted for exercising its republication rights under the Copyright
Act. In fact, the Justice Department is attempting to impose on our society the press
licensing and Crown Copyright laws of Great Britain, the very evil which the First
Amendment was written to eliminate.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 5495 (statement by Jack C. Landau and Robert C. Maynard)
(citations omitted).
127 S. 1 § 1731(a).
128 Id. § 1731(c)(2).
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ion offense is committed by a person who "receives, possesses, or
obtains control of property of another that has been stolen.' 2 9
The problem here is whether S. 1 continues the legislation by
30
stealth which was uncovered by analysts of its predecessor bill.'
Those who read S. 1400 carefully found an unexpected dimension
to the theft and receiving stolen property sections in the way
"property" was defined in the general definitions provisions which
were placed in an introductory section of S. 1400. That definition
of "property" included "intellectual property or information, by
whatever means preserved."' 13 ' This conceptualization of property
when linked together with the theft and receiving stolen property
provisions of S. 1400-far removed from the national security
chapter-achieved the startling result that a reporter who printed
or received classified information-as well as the editor and publisher-could be convicted of a crime carrying a long prison sentence.' 32 Equally, it meant that all information in the possession of
the government, even though paid for by the taxpayer and collected by public servants in the course of their public duty, was
metamorphosed into the private property of the government
bureaucracy which could keep it perpetually secret for as long as it
chose simply by classifying it as defense information.
Lest any reader believe erroneously that this is a paranoid or
strained reading of the interrelationship between the "intellectual
property" concept of property included in the definitions set forth
in S. 1400 and the theft and receiving stolen property provisions, it
must be noted that the Justice Department has repeatedly argued
in court that intellectual information is indeed the property of the
government. It took that position in the oral arguments in 1970
before the court of appeals and the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case. Its contention was that, under common law, the
executive branch has a proprietary interest in government reports
and that, accordingly, there was theft of government property
when they were published without authorization.1 33 Again, it took
129

Id. § 1733(a).

130 S. 1400 §§ 1731-32. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 5771-72 (statement of Radio

Television News Directors Association).
131 S. 1400 § 111.
132 The provisions of S. 1400 stated that "regardless of its monetary value" if the stolen

property was "a file, record, or other document, owned by, or under the care, custody, or
control of, the United States" the defendant was to receive a prison term of up to seven
years. See id. §§ 1731(c)(1)(B)(iii), 2301(b)(4).
133Hearings, supra note 2, at 5493 (statement by Jack C. Landau and Robert C.
Maynard).
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an identical position in the subsequent indictments of Daniel
Ellsberg and Anthony Russo, arguing in its trial brief in that
criminal action: "The content of such * * * documents is itself
government property quite apart from the government's ownership of the sheets of paper on which it is reported. 1 34 In view of
the fact that the Ellsberg-Russo trial was aborted by government
misconduct, the record is far from clear as to whether this sweeping doctrine stands any chance of winning judicial approval. S.
1400 was the Nixon Administration's version of codifying the federal criminal code. Unmistakably, the Nixon Administration would
have achieved by statute what it had failed to secure as decisional
law in the Ellsberg-Russo trial.
The inclusion of the term "intellectual property or information by whatever means preserved" in the definition of "property"
which marked S. 1400 alarmed spokesmen for the news profession.' 35 That language has been deleted from S. 1, presumably
because of their vigorous opposition. The substitute language
which now appears in the definition of "property" in S. 1 appears
broad enough, however, to support the Justice Department in its
continuing effort to regard classified information as subject to the
theft and receiving stolen property provisions of the criminal law.
S. 1 now defines "property" as "anything of value" including
"rights, privileges, interests, and claims."'1 36 "Property of another"
is defined in a similarly broad manner to mean
property in which a person or government has an interest upon
which the actor is not privileged to infringe without consent,
whether
or not the actor also has an interest in the prop1 37
erty.
In this writer's view, the rewriting of the "property" definition
simply does not eliminate the deliberately intended chilling effect
upon freedom of the press and first amendment rights which were
so patently present in the "intellectual property" link with the theft
and receiving stolen property provisions in S. 1400. The threat of
long jail sentences and heavy fines still is there to intimidate the
news media from investigative reporting, such as that which uncovered Watergate and eventually forced the resignation of President
Nixon himself.
134
135

Id.
See, e.g., id. at 5771 (statement of Radio Television News Directors Association); id.

at 5776 (Statement of American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.).
136 S. 1 § 111.
137

Id.

1975]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

Obstructing a Government Function by Fraud

Nor is the foregoing all that this ponderous bill offers to chill
freedom of the press. S. 1 continues unchanged a novel provision

138
S. 1
introduced in its predecessor by the Nixon Administration.

would establish the new offense of obstructing a government function by fraud. Under this section, a person commits a crime "if he
intentionally obstructs, impairs, or perverts a government function
39
by defrauding the government in any manner."'
The Brown Commission had not recommended any such offense. Rather, this section is still another insertion into federal
criminal law of first amendment invasions that traces back to the
unsuccessful prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo.
With the flimsiest of statutory bases, the indictment attempted to
devise an offense
to defraud the United States ...by impairing, obstructing, and
defeating its lawful government function of controlling the dissemination of classified Government studies, reports, memoranda
and communications ....140
By linking together the language of S. 1 with the Ellsberg
indictment, it becomes apparent that this provision is another
means of imposing criminal sanctions upon an investigative reporter who uses classified information. The issue raised is whether
the classification and suppression of information is "a government
function" sufficient to overcome the protection of freedom of the
press in the first amendment.
Criminal Issuance of a Written Instrument

One of the further probable legal boobytraps in this proposed
code is the section dealing with criminal issuance of a written
instrument. 14 ' This provision punishes a person
if, with intent to deceive or harm another person or a government,
he:
(1) issues a written instrument without authority; or
138

Compare id. § 1301 with S. 1400 § 1301.

139 S. I § 130 1(a). This is a class D felony punishable by a prison term up to seven years.

Id. §§ 1301(b), 2301(b)(4). The provisions of the Nixon Administration proposal are identical. See S. 1400 §§ 1301, 2301.
141 P. SCHRAG, supra note 43, at 383. This count of the indictment purported to be
based upon 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), which provides for punishment "[i]f two or more
persons conspire .. .to defraud the United States." This is the general conspiracy statute.
See notes 285-302 infra and accompanying text.
141 S. 1 § 1744.
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(2) utters
or possesses a written instrument that has been
1 42
so issued.
Placed in the chapter dealing with counterfeiting and forgery
offenses, this provision on its face appears to relate simply to bonds,
securities, notes, drafts, checks, and other evidence of indebtedness.
In actuality, the term has far broader scope. A "written instrument"
has been construed as "anything reduced to writing," and the terms
"instrument in writing," "instrument of writing," and "written instrument" are considered to be legally meaningful descriptive
phrases which imply an agreement or contract memorialized or
contained in the instrument. t4 3 It is, however, in an even broader
sense that the term is used in this section. The definition section for
the chapter defines "written instrument" as
(1) a security; (2) a paper, document, or other instrument containing
written orprintedmatter or its equivalent; or (3) a symbol or evidence of
value, right, privilege, interest, claim, or identification that is
capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of any
person ....144
What is produced by the interrelationship of the section punishing
criminal issuance and the definition of "written instrument" is the
unexpected and far from obvious statutory authority for a criminal
action against one who leaks a government paper or one who has such
a leaked paper in his possession. 4 5 The grounds for this action are
that there has been "criminal issuance of a written instrument" or
possession of one so issued "with intent to ...
harm . . . a
government." 14 6 The government need not be that of the United
States, but may be an associate or allied nation. The use of a
government paper or document to criticize dictatorial policies or
reveal atrocities such as the tiger cages for political prisoners used by
42 Id. § 1744(a). Virtually identical language appears in the provisions of S. 1400
§ 1742(a).
143 Rich v. Ervin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 386, 391, 194 P.2d 809, 812 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
S. 1 § 1746(i) (emphasis added). See also S. 1400 § 1744(h).
145 See S. 1 § 1744(c)(1)(A). This provision authorizes federal jurisdiction if the paper or
document had been "made or issued by or under the authority of... the United States." id.
Id. § 1744(a). The offense is a class D felony. Id. § 1744(b). Punishment may be
either up to seven years' imprisonment or a $100,000 fine. Id. §§ 2301(b)(4), 2201(b)(1)(A).
This is more severe than for disclosure of classified information under section 1124. Under
those provisions unless classified documents are communicated to a foreign agent, the
disclosure receives not more than three years' imprisonment. Id. §§ 1124(f)(2), 2301(b)(5).
However, a reporter "in unauthorized possession of national defense information" who
communicates it to others "not authorized to receive it" would receive the same punishment
of seven years under the mishandling provisions as he would under this section. See id.
§§ 1123(a)(1), (b), 2301(b)(4).
14
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the former South Vietnam government may constitute intent to
harm. Seen in this light, what appears superficially to be an innocuous
and routine criminal sanction against issuance, utterance, or possession of false or purloined checks, bonds, and the like is transformed
into a potent threat to those who release or possess documents
containing information that some government bureaucrat chooses to
keep secret. This section is accordingly yet another weapon in the
Government's arsenal of criminal sanctions aimed at newsmen and
others with an interest in publishing information about government
affairs.
Constitutional Implications
Analysis of the provisions of S. 1 reveals a battery of statutes
curtailing the flow to the public of information which concerns
government policies and activities. The various sections not only
affect the primary vehicle of information-the press-but also affect present and former government employees who serve as a
conduit to the press and the people. The S. 1 proposals have been
examined in light of current statutory and decisional law with the
purpose of understanding how this bill, if enacted, can operate as a
means of censorship. Constitutional defects have been perceived in
the drafting of various sections.
The executive fetish for secrecy and national security has been
well documented. Instituting criminal sanctions for violation of
executive classification regulations may therefore deprive the public, through the press, of access to vital information. The S. 1
provisions for punishment of government employees, if not unconstitutional, are highly undesirable. Nevertheless, criminal sanctions for employee disclosures of classified information have been
seen as contributing to a balancing between the fundamental right
of the people to know and the Government's need for secrecy and
administrative efficiency.1 47 The chilling effect, however, is obvious: For the people to be informed, an employee must pay the
price with time in prison. Such punishment has been conceptualized as deterring an individual from self-help disclosures and
encouraging disinterested judicial review. 148 With improvements in
procedures for reviewing the ex parte executive decision to classify
information, this may be eminently reasonable. However, the
147 Developments-National Security, supra note 99, at 1243-44; The Supreme Court, 1970
Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 211 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Term].
148 Developments-National Security, supra note 99, at 1244; 1970 Term, supra note 147, at
211-12.
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prosecution of such an employee should require proof that the
national interest -has been injured before punishment is inflicted.
The publication of classified information leaked by an
employee of the government may create conspiratorial or accomplice liability on the part of the press. This issue has a different
dimension to

it.

14 9

The press does not and cannot publish with complete impunity. The Government's attempt to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers'"0 raises some of the issues inherent in the continuing
tension between the Government's need for secrecy and the press'
obligation to inform. Answers, however, are only inferences drawn
from the numerous opinions in the case.' 5 ' This article will not
fully explore the limits of congressional power to impose criminal
sanctions upon the press or the meaning of New York Times Co. v.
United States. 152 Nevertheless, this historic decision suggests that the
proposed code's Official Secrets Act falls far short of the constitutional mark.
In New York Times, the Supreme Court tersely held that the
injunction against publication had been properly denied because
the Government had not met its "'heavy burden' " for justification
of a prior restraint. 15 3 In the separate opinions of the Justices, both
absolutist first amendment stances 1 54 and deference to executive
judgment1 5 5 were presented. A majority of the Court, however,
would seem to form a consensus around Justice Stewart's position.
He stated that publication may be prohibited only when it would
"surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our
Nation or its people.'

' 56

Justice Stewart intimated that this standard was applicable only
to injunctive proceedings and that a criminal action might present
149 See Henkin, supra note 51, at 277.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
"I' In addition to the short three-paragraph per curiam disposition of the action,
separate concurring or dissenting opinions were filed by each Justice, for a total of ten
opinions.
152 For an extended discussion of the New York Times case see Henkin, supra note 51,
and Rubin, supra note 45.
153 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting from Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415, 419 (1971)).
154 403 U.S. at 714-15 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
155 Id. at 756-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White joined in this opinion. Similar
views were expressed by Jug'tice Brennan in his concurrence. Id. at 726-27. The two Justices
espousing a philosophy of absolute first amendment freedom of the press, Black and
Douglas, might have been expected to join in at least this standard if necessary to form a
majority in a criminal action against the press.
150
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a different question.15 7 Several other Justices also suggested that
criminal sanctions might be levied against the press for publishing. 5 8 However, this surely is mistaken. "The distinction between
prior injunction and subsequent punishment is hallowed by history."' 5 9 In practice, the difference is virtually indistinguishable.
The forbidden consequence of the injunction is a prior restraint.
The deterrent and chilling effect of the criminal law achieves the
same result.16 0 Moreover, an injunction prohibits publication of
only certain specified material. The threat of criminal prosecution
may suppress publication of any information that begins to resemble the forbidden material.16' Consequently, at least the same constitutional demand must be made of injunctive and criminal pro1 62
ceedings.
In this regard, the proposed code indubitably fails. Nowhere
in any provision of the Official Secrets Act is there a requirement
that communication of the information by the press would "surely
result in direct, immediate, and irreparable harm." The proposed
code either completely fails to address this question of harm or
uses a standard that the communication by the press "may be used"
to national detriment. Unless the Government can show such in151 Id. at 730.
"I See id. at 733-40 (White, J., concurring); id. at 742 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
159 Henkin, supra note 51, at 278.
160 Id.; Developments-National Security, supra note 99, at 1241; 1970 Term, supra note

147, at 208-09.
161 1970 Term, supra note 147, at 209.
112 Developments-NationalSecurity, supra note 99, at 124 1-42; 1970 Term, supra note 147,
at 209. The student authors in their extensive examination of the relationship of civil liberties
and national security conclude:
Just as Brandenburg v. Ohio [395 U.S. 444 (1969)] stands for the principle that the
functioning of a democracy requires a free flow of ideas, so New York Times
represents the proposition that a free flow of information to the public is necessary
in a democracy to check governmental power. This principle applies equally to
criminal punishment. The national security interest in secrecy must always be
balanced against a public interest in disclosure of information; injury, even severe
injury, to national security interests should not trigger either an injunction or
criminal punishment until this balancing is carried out. For example, even though
disclosures of classified information about war crimes by American soldiers in
Vietnam might have some long-term impact on the war effort by undermining our
attempts to win the support of the indigenous population, the national security
interest would be too speculative in comparison to the strong public interest in
knowing about the effects the war was having on the discipline of our Army and the
character of our soldiers. The need for disclosures of this sort has become particularly great in recent years because of the growing tendency of the executive to make
major policy decisions affecting the national defense and foreign policy in secret
and, at times, to carry them into execution without informing Congress or the
public.
Developments-National Security, supra at 1241 (footnotes omitted).
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jury, it has no interest to override the right of the people to
know-from which springs the duty and the freedom of the press
to publish.
Even before Watergate, the press played a vital role in our
democratic system of government. The disclosures by able, unintimidated investigative reporters of the details of the Watergate
conspiracy, the My Lai massacre, cost overruns on military procurement, and the like have been of immeasurable benefit to the
country. They have revealed information the citizenry had a right
to know and which the federal bureaucracy desperately tried to
keep secret. With the attempt to enact the Official Secrets Act
provisions of S. 1 comes a pressing question: How sincere was the
Congress in pressing for the impeachment of President Richard M.
Nixon and recognizing the immeasurable value of the work of
these investigative reporters, and their colleagues throughout the
country, if only short months after his forced resignation there is
under active consideration by the Congress a bill which would
make it possible to imprison these and other reporters and editors
who with equal boldness and courage in the future publicize comparable news that will be embarrassing to post-Nixon administrations?
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVISIONS RELATING TO
ALLEGED OBSTRUCTION

OF MILITARY

RECRUITMENT

OR

INDUCTION AND INCITING INSUBORDINATION

The multiple provisions of the proposed code reflect-in other
areas too-the continuing philosophical approach of the Nixon Administration. At the time the Mitchell Department of Justice was
drafting S. 1400, there was extensive prosecution of those opposing an unpopular war in Vietnam. The Department of Justice was
then attempting to secure convictions for obstructing the administration of the selective service system 1 6 3 as well as prosecuting pro64
testers against the Vietnam War.1
In keeping with its antecedents in the Nixon Administration,
S. 1 predictably contains a section on obstructing military recruitment or induction.' 6 5 The scope of the broad language of this and
16' See, e.g., United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g en banc 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1972).
164 See, e.g., United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
165 S. I § 1116. See S. 1400 § 1116. For an analysis of the corresponding provision in the
Nixon Administration bill see Comment, supra note 115, at 929-32.
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related sections 16 6 is so sweeping that it would provide the legislative framework for punishing those persons in and out of the
service who utilize first amendment rights of speech or press and
other media to advise actual or potential members of the armed
services as to what the Government is doing with its military power
so that as members of the body politic they may be fully informed.
S. 1 establishes the crime of obstructing military recruitment
or induction in very broad language.1 6 7 Included among its proscribed activities is "incit[ing] others to engage in conduct constituting an offense under [the evading military or alternative civilian
service] section.'

68

Decisional law makes clear that this provision is

unconstitutional.
Congress has previously enacted a statute for the purpose of
dealing with obstruction of military recruitment or induction.'
One clause provided for criminal sanctions against
any person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere
or attempt to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise,
with the administration of [the selective service system] .... 170

However, in United States v. Baranski,t 7 t the Seventh Circuit
166 These are the provisions dealing with evading military or alternative civilian service

and with inciting or aiding mutiny, insubordination, or desertion. S. I §§ 1115, 1117. See also
S. 1400 §§ 1115, 1117.
167 The present version of the proposal reads in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of an offense if, in time of war and with intent to hinder,
interfere with, or obstruct the recruitment, conscription, or induction of a person
into the armed forces of the United States, he:
(1) creates a physical interference or obstacle to the recruitment, conscription, or induction;
(2) uses force, threat, intimidation, or deception against a public servant of
a government agency engaged in the recruitment, conscription, or induction;
or
(3) incites others to engage in conduct constituting an offense under
section 1115 (Evading Military or Alternative Civilian Service).
S. 1 § 1116(a). Section 1115 lists four types of evasion of military or alternative service:
failure, neglect, or refusal to (a) register, (b) submit to examination to determine availability,
(c) submit to induction, or (d) perform alternative civilian service. Id. § 11 15(a)(1). It is also
an offense to engage in conduct constituting the making of a false statement, as defined in
section 1343, with intent to obstruct recruitment or induction. Id. § 1115(a)(2). Incitement to
any one of these proscribed kinds of conduct would be punishable by imprisonment for a term
of not more than seven years. Id. § 2301(b)(4). A fine of up to $100,000 may be imposed. id.
§ 2201(b)(1)(A).
16I Id. § 1116(a)(3).
169 See Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894. The selective service law was
reenacted after World War II. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 12, 62 Stat. 622, as amended,
Act of Aug. 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586, as amended, Act of June 30, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 11, 81 Stat. 105, as amended, Act of Sept. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129,
§ 101(a)(31), 85 Stat. 352 (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 462 (1970)).
170 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
171 484 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1973).
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declared the statutory provision unconstitutionally overbroad and
violative of first amendment rights.172 Blood had been poured on
selective service files.17 3 Conduct such as this has received only
'' 74
limited first amendment protection as "symbolic speech."
Nevertheless, the Baranski court found that by forbidding "the use
t 75
this
of any means whatsoever" to hinder or interfere with the draft,
conduct
statutory provision infringed upon speech, writings, and
76
that were expressly protected by the first amendment.
The obstruction of military recruitment or induction provision
of S. 1 must be examined in the light of what the Seventh Circuit
ruled in Baranski:
[T]he difficulty with the challenged provision is that its ban is not
limited to expressive conduct "outside" the First Amendment.
For example, a speaker or writer might declare in strong and
persuasive terms that the war in Southeast Asia was intolerable
and unconscionable and that every citizen should vocally protest
the nation's participation. Irrespective of the correctness of such
a view, its delivery in speech or writing might be accomplished
with such a convincing sincerity that young auditors or readers
would flee to Canada rather than answering the call of their
Selective Service boards. Even though the words had this impact,
it would be difficult to conclude that the speechmaking or pamphleteering was other than protected activity. Yet, the actor
could be prosecuted for a violation . . .in that he had attempted

to hinder or interfere with the administration of the 77Selective
Service by means "otherwise" than force or violence.'
Id. at 570.
Id. at 558.
"7 Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) with Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1969). See generally Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The
Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Shugrue, An Inquiry into a Principle of "Speech
Plus," 3 CREIGHTON L. REV. 267 (1970).
7 484 F.2d at 564 (emphasis in original).
176 Id. at 565. The court applied the first amendment analysis enunciated in United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 358-64 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
The first step involved a determination whether the challenged legislation " 'relates to
expression'" and thus comes within the ambit of the first amendment. 484 F.2d at 563
(quoting from Dellinger, supra at 358). The court examined not only "the words of the statute
but .. .its impact also." 484 F.2d at 563-64. It found that the broad statutory language did
encompass first amendment activities. Id. at 564-65. The second analytical step was to
determine whether the statute's prohibited conduct relating to expression was "'so related to
action' " that the expressive conduct was removed from the scope of the first amendment. Id.
at 563 (quoting from Dellinger, supra at 358). Although the court recognized that there was
expressive conduct that might be properly sanctioned under the statute, it held that the
broad wording of the "or otherwise" clause infringed upon protected speech activities. 484
F.2d at 565-66. See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv.
844 (1970).
1 484 F.2d at 565. The "or otherwise" phrase was not included in the selective service
law prior to World War II. See Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894. It was
172

173
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The drafters of these sections of S. 1 have sought to avoid the
problem of overbreadth which proved constitutionally fatal to the
provision in Baranski. The latter statute forbade use "in any way, by
force or violence or otherwise" to hinder the operation of the draft
system. S. 1 permits a person to be charged with obstruction of
military recruitment or induction, if he "incites others to engage in
conduct constituting" evasion of military or alternative service.
Here again the draftsmanship, although artful, cannot avoid
the impact of the first amendment. While there is greater specificity in the means which are proscribed in interfering with recruitment or induction,1 78 the proposed legislation likewise "inescapably comprehends First Amendment interests. ' 179 It appears
irrefutable that this provision of S. 1 necessarily includes within it
the type of permissible speech and writing used as an example in
Baranski. This is a blatant attempt to utilize congressional adoption
of this enormous codification of the federal criminal laws to pump
life into restrictive legislation already ruled unconstitutional by the
courts.
The actual intent of the designers of this unconstitutional
provision may not have been to overrule Baranski and pave the way
to new prosecutions. Rather, these provisions of S. 1 would clearly
have a chilling effect on those who write, speak, publish, or utilize
television, mimeographs, or any other means of first amendment
communication which has a potentiality of being read or heard by
someone in the armed services or about to be inducted. A more
patent violation of first amendment rights can hardly be imagined.
Whatever happens ultimately to these provisions upon predictable challenge in the courts, the chilling effect will have been
achieved. 8 0 Congress cannot pass to the courts the sole responsibility
for protecting fundamental constitutional rights.
specifically placed in the statute in the 1948 reenactment. See Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625,
§ 12, 62 Stat. 622. The congressional intent of this addition was to remove the prosecutorial
burden of showing actual force or violence. United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009, 1013
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970).
17s By incorporating the specific provisions of section 1115, section 1116 may seem to
escape the defect found in Baranski of "outlawing the use of any and all means." See 484 F.2d
at 565.
179 Id.
i80The chilling effect on first amendment rights was addressed at some length in
Baranski:
The Government admits that the "hinder or interfere" clause when linked to
"otherwise" accomplishment is susceptible to unconstitutional application. It asserts,
however, that the provision affects First Amendment rights in only "remote circumstances" because its aim allegedly is the regulation of noncommunicative conduct only. As further support for the claim that the clause poses no substantial
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The sweeping prosecution of persons exercising first amendment rights suggested by the Seventh Circuit in Baranski may not
occur if S. 1 is enacted. The pending bill, unlike its progenitor S.
1400, limits the offense of obstructing military recruitment and
induction to "in time of war."' t8 1 As such, it seems to be a codificat8 2
tion of the Supreme Court's decision in Schenck v. United States
upholding wartime restraints on freedom of expression. 83 Al84
though the prosecution of peacetime draft resistance counseling'
may thus seem to be beyond the reach of the criminal law, the
question is not that simple. As will be discussed below, the proposed codification contains no definition of the important word
"war." Consequently, protests against actions such as the American
military involvement in Southeast Asia-which looked to many like
threat to First Amendment interests, the Government argues that no prosecutor has
yet misused the statute and that if an overzealous U.S. Attorney were to prosecute
someone for privileged conduct, the courts would point out his error.
The Government's response does not still the defendants' qualms-nor does it
allay our doubts as to the constitutionality question. The existence of the weapon is
the chilling factor in inhibiting free expression and the speculative possibility that
the weapon might not be used provides scant warmth to one whose proposed
expression might conceivably be within wounding range. In our discussion of the
void-for-vagueness issue, we indicated that the challenged provision provides
adequate warning because it informs one that all acts the intended effect of which is
the hindering of or interfering with the administration of the Selective Service Act
are forbidden. The statute, literally read, proscribes the use of any means whatsoever
to accomplish the hindrance.
Id. at 564 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The defendants in that case also
contended that the 1948 addition of the "or otherwise" phrase was intended to curtail the
exercise of first amendment rights. The court's response was succinct: "We decline to ascribe
this malevolent purpose to Congress." Id. at 568.
181 Compare S. I § 1116(a) with S. 1400 § 1116(a).
182 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
183 Id. at 51-52. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage
Act by attempting to obstruct military recruitment and induction. Id. at 48-49. The attempted obstruction was found in the defendant's printing and circulating a statement condemning the draft and urging men to resist induction. Id. at 49-50. After announcing the
famous clear and present danger test, Justice Holmes stated:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight,
and that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Id. at 52. For a discussion of freedom of speech in wartime see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES 80-140 (1941); Z. CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1-39 (1920); Carroll,
Freedom of Speech and the Press in Wartime-The Espionage Act, 17 MICH. L. REV. 621 (1919);
Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919); Fraenkel, War, Civil
Liberties and the Supreme Court 1941 to 1946, 55 YALE L.J. 715 (1946); Goodrich, Does the
Constitution ProtectFree Speech?, 19 MICH. L. REV. 487 (1921); Hall, Free Speech in War Time,
21 CoLuM. L. REv. 526 (1921); O'Brian, Restraints Upon Individual Freedom in Times of National
Emergency, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 523 (1941); Swisher, Civil Liberties in War Time, 55 POL. ScI. Q.
321 (1940).
"" See, e.g., United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1969); cf. United States
v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1973).
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a war-might still be included and the proper exercise of first
amendment rights punished.
First amendment violations also appear in the provisions con85
cerning inciting or aiding mutiny, insubordination, or desertion.
This includes incitement of a member of the military to refuse to
carry out a duty. 86 There are two aspects of first amendment
rights involved here: those of members of the armed services and,
entirely separate and distinct from those rights, the first amendment rights of civilians.
This section of S. 1 appears to make the test of the incitement
the possible effect on the person who is a member of the armed
forces. Since soldiers and other members of the military do not
have constitutional rights of the same quality and extent as civilians
do, 8 7 this impact test is significant. There has apparently been only
one case in which a court-martial conviction has been reversed
because of an overly broad abridgement of free speech.188 More
'85

S. I § 1117(a). This section of the bill provides in pertinent part:

A person is guilty of an offense if:
(1) with intent to bring about mutiny, insubordination, refusal of duty, or
desertion by members of the armed forces of the United States, he incites such
members to engage in mutiny, insubordination, refusal of duty, or desertion;
(2) he aids or abets the commission or attempted commission of mutiny or
desertion by a member of the armed forces of the United States; or
(3) he interferes with, hinders, delays, or prevents the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of a member of the armed
forces of the United States, knowing that such member has deserted ....
Id. The offense of incitement is punishable by up to fifteen years' imprisonment if committed
in wartime or the military personnel have been or are about to be committed to combat. See
id. §§ 11 17(b)(1), 2301(b)(3). Imprisonment for not more than seven years is the penalty for
any other violation of this section except the hindering and delaying of desertion prosecutions. See id. §§ 11 17(b)(2), 2301(b)(4). This latter offense receives a prison term of not more
than three years. See id. §§ 11 17(b)(3), 2301(b)(5). Cf. S. 1400 § 1117.
186 S. 1 § 1117(a)(l).
I7 United States v. Priest, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 (1972); United
States v. Gray, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 63, 66, 42 C.M.R. 255, 258 (1970). See generally Boyce, Freedom
of Speech and the Military, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 240; Brown, Must the Soldier Be A Silent Member
of Our Society?, 43 MIL. L. REV. 71 (1969); Kester, Soldiers Who Insult the President: An Uneasy
Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1697 (1968);
Sherman, The Military Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 325
(1971); Vagts, Free Speech in the Armed Forces, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 187 (1957); Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 181 (1962); Wulf, A Soldier's First Amendment
Rights: The Art of Formally Granting and PracticallySuppressing, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 665 (1972);
Comment, Military Discipline and Political Expression: A New Look at an Old Bugbear, 6 HARV.
Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 525 (1971); Note, PriorRestraints in the Military, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 1089 (1973).
In Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953), the Supreme Court expressed the relationship
of constitutional guarantees vis-h-vis the military in its classic form: "[T]he rights of men in
the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty." Id. at 140.
8I Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392, 1402-03 (D.D.C. 1972). In this habeas corpus
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typical of the extent of military free speech is the case of an
off-duty reserve officer who participated in a public demonstration
against the Vietnam War and had carried a sign with derogatory
comments toward the president.' 8 9 The military court of appeals
upheld the three-year maximum sentence imposed upon speech
and expressional activity that would have received first amendment
protection in a civilian court. a9 0 The penalty might have been even
heavier if he had specifically disobeyed the order of a superior
officer to stop carrying the sign. This could then have been
punished as insubordination. 9 1 Yet this could also have led to
punishment of a civilian exercising first amendment rights if the
proposed language of S. 1 had been law. It would then have been
action, the plaintiffs had been convicted of making disloyal statements "design[ed] to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the troops." Id. at 1394. The statement had urged
other members of the military "to join [plaintiffs] to 'voice our opposition' to the war in
Vietnam." Id. at 1405. The district court found no clear danger to the discipline and respect
for duty needed by the military:
[M]ere anti-war thoughts or propaganda cannot be kept from military ears simply
on the ground that the soldiers will be less highly motivated because of what they
hear. Motivation is too intangible a concept to suffice to meet the directness
required for a prejudice to order to override the First Amendment. To proscribe
speech by servicemen there must be truly direct and palpable prejudice to good
military order and discipline. None was shown here.
Id. at 1406.
Stolle has been characterized as "the first federal court decision to reverse a court-martial
conviction on first amendment grounds." Note, supra note 187, at 1097. Stolte's first amendment analysis has not been applied to any other overbreadth issue involving military free
speech. But see Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 934, 941 (D.D.C. 1974)
(army regulation prohibiting posters on barracks wall if they are deemed " 'a clear danger to
military loyalty, discipline, or morale' " void under first amendment for vagueness); Carlson
v. Schlesinger, 364 F. Supp. 626, 633 (D.D.C. 1973) (air force regulation restricting first
amendment right to petition public officials void for vagueness and overbreadth).
"9 United States v. Howe, 37 C.M.R. 555, 556-57 (Bd. Rev. 1966), reconsiderationdenied,
17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
"' United States v. Howe, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 174-77, 180-81, 37 C.M.R. 429, 438-41,
444-45 (1967).
2' Article 91 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in proscribing insubordinate
conduct provides in pertinent part:
Any warrant officer or enlisted member who(2) willfully disobeys the lawful order of a warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer ...
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 891 (1970). Failure to obey an order is sanctioned by Article 92 which provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who(1) violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;
(2) having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by a member of the
armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or
(3) is derelict in the performance of his duties;
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
Id. § 892. See generally Comment, supra note 187.
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possible for the Department of Justice to bring an action for violation of this section, claiming that the soldier's insubordination had
been incited by a civilian speaker expressing anti-war sentiments
and urging all citizens to become actively involved in protesting
against the war."9 ' Thus, these provisions, if enacted, will have the
effect of imposing upon civilians the restrictive philosophy which
sharply curtails first amendment rights for those who are under
93
military discipline.'
THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

DEFINITION OF TREASON

A fundamental constitutional question is raised in the section
of S. 1 dealing with treason against the United States.' 9 4 That
question is the extent to which the legislative definition of treason
95
must follow that of the Constitution.'
The Constitution provides that "Treason . . .shall consist only

in levying War against [the United States], or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."' 9 6 The current treason
statute follows this constitutional language, but omits reference to
the two-witness rule of the Constitution.

97

S. 1 drastically departs

from current law by including a definition of "levying war against
the United States."
A person is guilty of treason under the proposed legislation if
he
Cf. Comment, supra note 115, at 932. See also Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392
(D.D.C. 1972) where the court stated:
Strictly speaking, every statement critical of a military program or policy can have
an effect on attitudes and morale, which can arguably affect in turn order and
discipline ....
...This rationale would support restriction of all dissent on war aims, even by
civilians and elected officials.
Id. at 1403 (emphasis in original).
1' Cf. Comment, supra note 115, at 932.
192

194 S. I § 1101.

Comment, supra note 115, at 924-25.
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 3, cl.1.
197
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or
adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or
elsewhere, is guilty of treason ....
Id. The procedural protection of the two-witness rule appears in U.S. CONsT. art. I1, § 3,cl.
1, which provides in pertinent part: "No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court."
For an extensive examination of the law of treason see Hurst, Treason in the United States
(pts. 1-3), 58 HARV. L. REV. 226, 395, 806 (1944-45); Loane, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30
MIL. L. REV. 43 (1965); Steinhaus, Treason, A Brief History With Some Modern Applications, 22
BROOKLYN L. REV. 254 (1956).
195
"'6

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:591

(1) adheres to the foreign enemies of the United States and
intentionally gives them aid and comfort; or
(2) levies war against the United States by engaging in armed
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or a
state with intent to:
(A) overthrow, destroy, supplant, or change the form of
the government of the United States; or
(B) sever a state's relationship with the United States.'

These provisions of S. 1 are virtually identical to the proposal
of the Nixon Administration bill in the 93rd Congress.1 9 9 The
purpose of the change in the present definition of treason apparently is to bring within the scope of treason such civil disorders as
engulfed the country in 1967 in the black ghettos. This unprecedented definition of treason was written against that background,
as well as during the time when the Nixon Administration regarded
public demonstrations against the Vietnam war as giving aid and
comfort to the enemy. The proposed section, if enacted, will be a
potent threat against the continuing peace movement as well as
against black organizations, Chicano groups, and others which can
be charged with armed violence-constituting treason under this
expanded and novel definition.
As with espionage, the offense of treason is punishable by
death under a vague standard: where "the defendant, in the commission of the offense, knowingly created a grave risk of substantial impairment of the national defense. ' 20 0 Even without imposition of the death penalty, the sanctions imposed are harsh and
punitive. Two levels of offenses are established. 20 ' Adherence to
the foreign enemies of the United States and intentionally giving
198 S. I § 1101(a) (emphasis added). The bill's section 1101(a)(2) thus is a congressional
attempt to reformulate the Constitution's definition of treason. However, "Congress can
neither extend, nor restrict, nor define the crime. Its power over the subject is limited to
prescribing the punishment." United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 21 (No. 15,254)
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863). As observed by one commentator, within the context of S. 1400's
unaltered treason provision, this raises profound questions as to whether the judicial power to
construe the Constitution has been infringed. Comment, supra note 115, at 924-25. Admittedly,
the question is far from easy. Congress has broad constitutional power to fix penalties. As one
authority has asserted, having been delegated the power to punish,
Congress could hardly be denied the right to set different grades of punishment and,
necessarily, to specify the varieties of treasonable conduct to which the respective
penalties should apply.
Hurst, supra note 197 (pt. 2), at 419 (footnote omitted). Thus, constitutional prohibition of a
federal offense embracing conduct envisioned by the treason provision may seem to conflict
with the recognized power of Congress to fix penalties. Comment, supra at 925.
199 Compare S. 1400 § 1101 with S. I § 1101.
0 S.1 § 240 1(a)(1)(B). The full text of the pertinent provision may be found in note 74
supra. The death penalty is provided in the current treason statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970).
20. S. 1 § I101(b).
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them aid and comfort is made a class A felony, punishable with
imprisonment for the duration of the defendant's life or any lesser
time. 1202 This is a charge that could conceivably be levied against
those members of peace organizations who have gone on peace
missions to Hanoi, have dealt directly with Prince Sihanouk of
Cambodia, or have conferred with the NLF or PRG in Paris or
South Vietnam. 20 3 Armed rebellion against the United States or a
state, as contained in the treason section, is treated as a class B
felony, 20 4 punishable by up to thirty years imprisonment.2 " 5
ARMED REBELLION

OR

INSURRECTION

Black movements, Indian, Chicano, and other activist organizations as well as the peace movement are put in jeopardy by the
provisions of S. 1 dealing with armed rebellion or insurrection. 0 6
This offense is committed by a person "if he engages in armed
rebellion or insurrection against the United States with intent to
oppose the execution of any law of the United States. 20 7
Like other harsh measures included in S. 1, this provision
allows implementation of plans of the Nixon Administration to
crush or intimidate the protest movements of the 1960's. It must be
considered against the backdrop of what has been learned about
the infiltration into various dissident groups of agents provocateurs
by the F.B.I., the C.I.A., Army Intelligence, and a variety of other
agencies. 20 8 Many of these infiltrating informers and undercover
202 Id.

§

2301(b)(1).

Additionally,

a fine of up

to $100,000

is authorized.

Id.

§ 2201(b)(1)(A). The death penalty is available for treason of the class A felony caliber. Id.

§ 2401(a)(1).
20

Cf. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343

U.S. 935 (1952) (during World War II, an American citizen ofJapanese ancestry made radio
broadcasts fromJapan to American troops with intent to destroy their confidence and morale).
204 S 1 § 1101(b)(2).
204 Id. § 2301(b)(2). A fine of up to $100,000 is also authorized. Id. § 2201(b)(l)(A).
206 S. 1 § 1102.
207 Id. § 1102(a). It is punishable as a class C felony with a prison term up to fifteen years and
a fine of $100,000. See id. §§ 1102(b), 2301 (b)(3), 2201 (b)(I)(A). The provisions ofS. 1400 were
identical. See S. 1400 § 1102.
The current rebellion or insurrection statute is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2383 (1970) which

provides:
Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection
against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof, or gives aid or comfort

thereto, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.
200

In

the recent Rockefeller Commission study of C.I.A. activities, the illegal use of

infiltrators and informers was underscored:
Responding to Presidential requests made in the face of growing domestic
disorder, the Director of Central Intelligence in August 1967 established a Special
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operatives have been found to be the ones who sought to induce
others to use arms, bombs, or otherwise engage in conduct which
could come within the scope of this section. 2' 9 The armed rebellion
and insurrection provisions seek to capitalize on the fears and
hysteria of the sixties to impose upon the nation repressive legislation stemming from the "law and order" rhetoric of former President Nixon and the tensions of the cold war. It is part and parcel
of the punitive approach toward dissenters and progressives that
marked the Nixon Administration and is carried forward in the
post-Nixon era by the proponents of S. 1.
THE INTIMIDATING EFFECT OF THE CODE
PROVISIONS RELATING TO SABOTAGE

Numerous threats to the Bill of Rights, the right to strike, the
freedom of association, the rights of trade unions, 2 t0 and the right
Operations Group within the CIA to collect, coordinate, evaluate and report on the
extent of foreign influence on domestic dissidence.
The Group's activities, which later came to be known as Operation CHAOS, led
the CIA to collect information on dissident Americans from CIA field stations overseas
and from the FBI.
Although the stated purpose of the Operation was to determine whether there
were any foreign contacts with American dissident groups, it resulted in the accumulation of considerable material on domestic dissidents and their activities.
Commencing in late 1969, Operation CHAOS used a number of agents to collect
intelligence abroad on any foreign connections with American dissident groups. In
order to have sufficient "cover" for these agents, the Operation recruited persons from
domestic dissident groups or recruited others and instructed them to associate with
such groups in this country.
Summary ofRockefellerPanel'sC.I.A. Report, N.Y. Times,June 11, 1975, at 19, cols. 4-5 (N.J. ed.).
See also N.Y. Times, April 24, 1975, at 22, cols. 4-8 (N.J. ed.); Developments-NationalSecurity,
supra note 99, at 1270-84.
209

Brown, Introduction, in CONSPIRACY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HARRISBURG TRIAL

FOR THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 20-26 (1. Raines ed. 1974).

Reviewing the actions of Boyd Douglas, the Government's agent and chief witness in the
so-called Harrisburg Seven trial, one commentator has observed:
Cumulative evidence emerges from the testimony that it was he who made repeated
attempts to provoke the group to levels of violence that were his own idea and not
theirs; it was he, not those indicted, who tried to persuade Bucknell coeds to engage in
illegal antiwar activities; it was he who insisted that a gun would be needed to kidnap
Kissinger and stated that he could provide one; it was he who wrote a political science
professor at Bucknell suggesting the destruction of the ROTC building; it was he who
(in an extraordinarily "provocative" act) gave two manuals on explosives to Father
Wenderoth, manuals that another FBI agent had procured for him from the
aforementioned ROTC building at Bucknell. In these and other instances there was an
attempt to "provoke" people to levels of activity and violence that were not their own
idea but his.
Id. at 21. See United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd inpartand rev'd in
partsub nom. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally W. O'ROURRE,
THE HARRISBURG 7 AND THE NEW CATHOLIC LEFT 140-215 (1972).

210 In Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley-Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968), the Supreme Court stated:
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to boycott or refuse to work on any type of materials to be used for
war purposes of either the United States or any "associate nation"
of the United States (which includes virtually all of the right-wing
dictatorships in the entire world) appear in the section dealing with
sabotage 2 1' and a cluster of related sections. 1 2 While the sabotage
proposal substantially follows the current statutory formulations of
the offense, 213 the potential for abuse and repression that has
existed will be enhanced if S. I is enacted. The charge of sabotage
has been successfully leveled against protesters of American military policy where "a two-by-four partition board was charred, and ...
two fatigue uniforms were burned" during a demonstration. 4
A person is guilty of sabotage under S. 1
if, with intent to impair, interfere with, or obstruct the ability of
[P]eaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent
other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First
Amendment.
Id. at 313. But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 564-67 (1972), where the Court held
that owners of a shopping center open to the public could prohibit peaceful distribution of
handbills concerning the Vietnam war.
The right to strike, although not absolute, is an essential and lawful tool of labor and is
protected by the fourteenth amendment. Compare Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926)
with American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184,209 (1921). See
generally Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 243 (1963); Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574 (1951); Gould,
Black Powerin the Unions: The Impact on Collective BargainingRelationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46, 77-83
(1969); Note, Majority Rule and the Right to Strike, 16 U. CHI. L. REV. 307 (1949).
211 S. I § 1I11. See also S. 1400 § 1111.
2'
These include the provisions relating to impairing military effectiveness; violating an
emergency regulation; impairing military effectiveness by a false statement; evading military or
alternate civilian service; obstructing military recruitment or induction; inciting or aiding
mutiny, insubordination, or desertion; and aiding the escape of a prisoner of war or an enemy
alien. S. I §§ 1112-18. See also S. 1400 §§ 1112-18.
213 Compare S. I § 1111 with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2151-57 (1970). The current sabotage laws have
basically two levels of offense. The first punishes destruction or defective production of war
materials, premises, or utilities. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2153(a), 2154(a). These provisions require
intent... or ... reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, orobstruct the
United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war or
defense activities ....
Id. These offenses can occur only when thecountry"isatwar,orin timesof national emergency
as declared by the President or by the Congress." Id.
The second category of sabotage offense consists of destruction or defective production of
"national-defense" materials, premises, or utilities. Id. §§ 2155(a), 2156(a). The state of mind
required by these sections is "intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of
the United States." Id. There is no requirement of war or national emergency. National defense
materials, premises, and utilities are broadly defined. See id. § 2151. However, there is no
definition of the term "national defense."
For cases applying the sabotage laws see United States v. Eisenberg, 469 F.2d 156 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 992 (1973); United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 932 (1972); United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
214 United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91, 93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 932
(1972).
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the United States or an associate nation to prepare for or to
engage in war or defense activities, he:
(1) damages, tampers with, contaminates, defectively
makes, or defectively repairs:
(A) any property that is owned by, or is under the
care, custody, or control of, the United States or an
associate nation, or that is being produced, manufactured,
constructed, repaired, transported, or stored for the
United States or an associate nation;
(B) any other property that is particularly suited for
national defense use;
(C) any facility that is engaged in whole or in part, for
the United States or an associate nation, in:
(i) furnishing defense materials or services; or
(ii) producing raw material necessary to the

support of a national defense production or mobilization program; or
(D) any public facility;
(2) delivers any property described in paragraph (1) (A) or
(1) (B) that has been damaged, tampered with, contaminated,
defectively made, or defectively repaired; or
(3) delays or obstructs:
(A) the production, manufacture, construction, repair, or delivery of any property described in paragraph

(1) (A) or (1) (B); or

2 5
(B) a service of a public facility. 1

The crime of sabotage, thus broadly and vaguely defined,2"'
S. I § 1111 (emphasis added).
216 Cf. United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91, 95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 932
215

(1972); United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774, 780-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
In Achtenberg, the defendant attacked the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2153(a) (1970). He
contended:
"The vague terms are 'defense activities', 'reason to believe', 'national emergency', 'preparing for', 'war material' and 'war premises'. Both the terms themselves
and the manner in which they are interlinked or applied in the statute, create the
constitutional infirmity."
459 F.2d at 95. Alluding to the definition section of the statute, the court rejected the
argument stating: "The statute and its legislative history show that Congress intended the
coverage to be broad." Id. These provisions of the current sabotage law are outlined in note
213 supra.
The vagueness argument was likewise rebuffed as to the national defense provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 2155 (1970). In Melville, the defendants attacked the inclusion of "myriad items"
in the definitions section. In disposing of this contention, the district court stated: "The fact
that the definitions cover many items does not render the statute vague. If anything, it is
explicit, albeit all-encompassing." 309 F. Supp. at 780. The defendants also claimed vagueness in the absence of a definition of "national defense." On this point, the court adopted the
approach the Supreme Court had taken in construing the Espionage Act which also lacked a
definition of this term:
"National defense, the Government maintains, 'is a generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related activities
of national preparedness.' We agree . ... "
Id. (quoting from Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (1941)).
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carries the heaviest imaginable criminal sanctions. It is ranked as a
class A felony in the situations enumerated in subsections (1) or (2)
if it is perpetrated "in time of war" and there is damage or interference with a major offensive or defensive system or with retaliation against attack. 21 7 As such, it may be punished by death or life
imprisonment. 2 1s Penalties of this severity are not authorized by
2 19
existing law.
S. 1 punishes intentional interference with "the ability . . .to
prepare for ... war or defense activities. ' ' 2 2 0 However, preparation
for war and engaging in defense activities go on all the time and
are not limited to times of war or a presidentially declared national
emergency. 2 2' Although the similar provisions of existing sabotage
law have been sustained against a vagueness challenge,2 2 2 there is
an urgent need for a definition of "war" and "defense activities." A
Although no overbreadth argument was made by the defendants, the court addressed
this issue. It stated that such a claim would fail because the relevant part of the statute
"requires that the destruction of defense utilities or material be done with intent to injure,
interfere with or obstruct the national defense." 309 F. Supp. at 780 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2155
(1970)).
2.7S. I § 1111(b)(1).
211 Id. §§ 2401(a)(1), 2301(b)(1).
Fines of up to $100,000 are also authorized. Id. § 2201(b)(1)(A). Sabotage is defined as a
class B felony if the offense involves merely obstruction or delay of production or delivery of
materiel during wartime or if it occurs "during a national defense emergency." id.
§ 111 l(b)(2). The person convicted of this degree of sabotage is liable to imprisonment up to
thirty years and a $100,000 fine. Id. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2201(b)(1)(A). Finally, sabotage in all
other cases is rated as a class C felony punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment and a
$100,000 fine. Id. §§ I1I1 (b)(3), 2301(b)(3), 2201(b)(1)(A).
219 Destruction or defective production of war materials invokes a sanction of thirty
years' imprisonment or a $10,000 fine. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2153(a), 2154(a) (1970). Destruction or
defective production of national defense materials receives a ten-year prison term or
$10,000 fine. Id. §§ 2155(a), 2156(a). There is no provision for a death penalty.
220 S. 1 § I11 l(a). The "interference" need not be with national defense. E.g., painting a
slogan on a mail-box would be punishable if done with the requisite intent. See S. I
§ I I I Il(a)(l)(A).
221 Unlike the provisions of S. 1, the present sabotage statute requires that the country
be "at war, or in [a state] of national emergency as declared by the President or by the
Congress," to invoke its most severe sanctions of thirty years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2153-54 (1970). The lesser offenses of destruction or defective production of "nationaldefense materials" do not require this precondition. See id. §§ 2155-56. The Korean conflict
prompted a proclamation of national emergency by President Truman. Proclamation of
Dec. 16, 1950, 64 Stat. A454. In 1953, Congress added the phrase "or defense activities" to
sections 2151, 2153, and 2154 wherever the term "war" appeared. Act of June 30, 1953, ch.
175, § 2, 67 Stat. 133, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2157 (1970). It also provided for an extension of
the effect of the "defense activities" provisions "until six months after the termination of the
national emergency" declared by President Truman. Id. There has been no termination of
that state of national emergency. However, the possibility of limiting the sabotage provisions
to time of war is an important distinction between current law and S. 1.
212 United States v. Achtenberg, 459 F.2d 91,95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 932 (1972);
United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). These cases are discussed in note
216 supra.
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potential for sweeping and arbitrary prosecution and punishment
of sabotage exists with the present absence of such definitions.
The crucial danger in the proposed sabotage provision is the
finding of "intent to impair, interference with or obstruct." S. 1
makes strikers and perhaps even negligent workers liable up to the
death penalty, provided only that they are found guilty of the
requisite intent. Any interference with production, any delay or
obstruction, any faulty manufacture or delivery provides the factual foundation upon which a conviction for "sabotage" can be
based. It seems undeniable that this section bestows upon the
Government the most intimidating weapon possible to force unions
and workers to do whatever they are told during an unpopular war or
period of national emergency, or even in preparation for war or
national defense-which means at any time.
Let there be no misunderstanding as to the grim seriousness of
this startling provision to be made available to the Department of
Justice to curb dissent aimed at any "national defense" activity.
Longshoremen boycotting shipment of goods to South Africa or to
some future equivalent of South Vietnam would make themselves
vulnerable to these harsh provisions. This goes far beyond destruction of machinery and material or the ordinary notion of sabotage.
The proposed section would prohibit any action, organized or
individual, provided only that the Department of Justice can prove
intent to hinder the war and defense ability of the United States or
any of its collection of discredited dictatorships included within the
euphemistic term "associate nation.

223

No one can regard this proposal and its chilling effect upon all
workers with equanimity. Organized labor in particular should
carefully read this proposed section and its related offenses and
ponder how they may be misused. Perjurious informers and
infiltrators can readily provide testimony as to the necessary in213 The proposed codification adopts a similar definition of this term provided in existing

law. Compare S. 1 § 111 with 18 U.S.C. § 2151 (1970). The S. I definition provides in pertinent
part: "'[A]ssociate nation' means a nation at war with a foreign power with which the United
States is at war." S. I § I 1l. The identical provision in S. 1400 was cogently criticized:
The purpose in using the term "associate nation" is to criminalize an action by a
United States citizen taken in relaton [sic] to a foreign nation as if the action had been
taken in relation to the United States,providedonly that the foreign nation is at war with
some foreigners with whom the United States is at war. The citizen would be
prosecuted and face a possible death sentence, even if the foreign nation's interests
and goals were inimical to those of the United States. This nation's defense needs do
not require that kind of treatment of its citizens.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 6912 (statement of William G. Florence) (emphasis in original). See
S. 1400 § 111.
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tent. 224 More frighteningly, if labor, any union, or individual fails

to work allotted hours with docility and dares to join or be active in
the present or any future peace movement or oppose any dictatorship accepted as an "associate nation," this may be labelled as the
requisite guilty state of mind necessary for the offense.
The Government may overcome difficulties in proving the
requisite intent for sabotage by invoking the related offense of
impairing military effectiveness.2 2 5 This section punishes exactly the
same conduct as sabotage but requires only a showing of "reckless
disregard of the risk that [the] conduct might impair" war or defense
preparations or activities. 2 26 Although some protection is afforded to
delays or obstructions in production and delivery that result from
"the usual course of lawful labor strike activity, ' 2 2 7 the chilling effect
on labor is apparent. Moreover, the provision may be utilized, for
example, against participants in a public demonstration which causes
traffic obstructions and hence possibly delays the delivery of property
22 8
used in war or national defense activities.

These sections are a frightening time bomb in our statutory law,
which will, if enacted, have the most chilling effect on the freedom of
association, collective bargaining, the right to strike, and the right to
oppose the foreign and "national defense" and "war" policies of this
country.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DEFINE "WAR"
IN

THE PROPOSED CODE

Nowhere in this enormous bill is there a definition of the crucial
word "war." Yet permeating the various sections of the proposed
code is the basic concept that there should be differential treatment
dependent upon whether the country is at war. In the hearings on the
codification of federal criminal laws both the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York and the American Civil Liberties Union urged
2 29
Congress to insert a definition of "war" into the proposed code.
224

See BrownIntroduction, in

CONSPIRACY:

[HE IMPLICATIONS

OF THE HARRISBURG rRIAL

FOR THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 20-25 (J. Raines ed. 1974). Professor Brown notes that a paid

informer "faces an almost irresistible urge to reveal more than there actually is to reveal."Id. at
24. See also notes 208-09 supra.
225 S. 1 § 1112. See also S. 1400 § 1112.
226 S.

I § I I12(a).

Id. § 11 12(a) (2). This subsection also protects "other lawful concerted activity for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and portection [sisc]." Id.
227

228 See Reisig, supra note 8, at 15, cols. 2-3. Compare S. 1 § 1 112(a) (2) with id. § 1 11 (a) (3).

229 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Comm. on the Proposed New
Federal Criminal Code, The New Criminal Code Proposed by the National Commission on Reform of
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The importance of clarifying precisely what is meant by "war" may be
demonstrated by reference to particular sections of S. 1.
Whether or not the country is at "war" is of paramount importance, for example, in the provisions which deal with sabotage2 30 and
espionage. 23 ' Under S. 1, sabotage may occur at anytime, with the
existence of war affecting only the severity of the criminal sanction. If
it is committed "in time of war" and there is damage or impairment to
a major offensive or defensive system or a retaliatory strike, it may be
punished by death.23 2 Publication of government information by a
reporter deemed to be espionage under the Official Secrets Act may
233
also result, "in time of war," in the death penalty.
In the absence of a definition of "war," the difficult issue of
determining whether a war exists is necessarily left to the courts
which must try the individual cases brought under the sabotage and
espionage sections or similar provisions containing the crucial term
"war." The Vietnam conflict has never been declared to be a war and
the courts have been unwilling to become involved in the controversy
of defining presidential authority to commit American forces to
combat. 23 4 The War Powers Resolution 235 provides for a time period
during which the president may seemingly carry on an executive war
before coming to Congress for its approval.2 36 Here is an alarming
risk of arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing, dependent upon the
way an individual court rules on national security cases which require
determining whether the country is at "war. "237
In addition to the sentencing issue, a related problem arises in
Federal CriminalLaws, in Hearings, supra note 2, at 3513; Hearings,supra note 2, at 1452-53
(statement of American Civil Liberties Union).
230 S. I § 1111.
231 Id. § 1121.
232 See id. § I11 I (b). The sabotage provisions are discussed at length at notes 2l0-28supra
and accompanying text.
233 S. I § 1121 (b). The espionage provisions are discussed at length at notes 59-76supra and
accompanying text.
234 Rodino, Congressional Review of Executive Action, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 489, 498-500
(1974). See generally Note, Congress, the President, and the Power To Commit Forces to Combat, 81
HARv. L. REV. 1771 (1968).

50 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq. (Supp. 111 1974).
See id. §§ 1543(a), 1544(b). Unless Congress has declared war, the President must
report to Congress within forty-eight hours of the commitment of American troops to combat.
Id. § 1543(a). The military involvement may continue for up to sixty days without a declaration
of war or other congressional authorization. Id. § 1544(b). However, Congress can direct the
withdrawal of American military forces before expiration of sixty days by passing a concurrent
resolution. Id. § 1544(c). See generally Rodino, supra note 234, at 513-17; Note, 1973 War Powers
Legislation: Congress Reasserts Its Warmaking Power, 5 LoYoLA U. CH. L.J. 83 (1974).
237 Cf. Comment, supra note 115, at 933 (discussing the provisions of S. 1400).
235

236
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those sections where the existence of war is an element or precondition of the crime. The offense of obstructing military recruitment 2 38 can only occur "in time of war. ' 239 The definition of the
term is also of vital importance in determining whether there has
been injury to the "war activities" of the United States or an
2 40
associate nation, thus constituting sabotage.

A similar difficulty appears in the provisions of S. 1 dealing
with impairing military effectiveness by a false statement. 24 I Like
the obstruction of recruitment or induction, this section links together issues of constitutional freedom of speech and the question
of defining war.2 42 This crime is committed if a person, "in
time of war," communicates specified types of information or
statements that are false in fact "with intent to aid the enemy or to
impair . . . the ability of the United States to engage in war or
defense activities. '24 3 The forbidden statements include the broad,

open ended, ambiguous provision of
any other matter of fact that, if believed, would be likely to affect
the strategy or tactics of the military forces of the United States
2 44
or would be likely to create general panic or serious disruption.
The offense is punishable by up to fifteen years imprisonment if done "with intent to aid the enemy. ' 245 It thus opens the
door to prosecution of those who communicate with nationals of a
country our Government considers the "enemy," probably bringing
within its scope activities analogous to the publicity given to visits to
238 S. I § 1116.

23 Id. § 1116(a). This section of the bill is discussed at length at notes 163-84 supra and
accompanying text.
24 S. 1 § l1ll(a). These provisions are discussed at length at notes 210-28 supra and
accompanying text.
241 S. 1 § 1114.
242 Comment, supra note 115, at 933 (discussing the substantially identical provisions of S.
1400 § 1114).

S. I § 1114(a).
Id. § 11 14(a)(3). The other false statements punished by this section regard "losses,
plans, operations, or conduct of the military forces of the United States, of an associate nation,
or of the enemy; ...civilian or military catastrophe." Id. § 11 14(a) (1)-(2). Under the current
statute an offense is committed
when the United States is at war, [a person] willfully makes or conveys false reports or
false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or
naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies . . ..
18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1970).
245 See S. 1 §§ 1114(b)(1), 2301(b)(3). A fine of $100,000
is also authorized. Id.
§ 2201(b) (1) (A). Under any other circumstances, it is punishable by a prison term of up to seven
years or a $100,000 fine. See id. §§ 1114(b)(2), 2301(b)(4), 2201(b)(1)(A).
243
244
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Hanoi at a time when our troops and airplanes were actively
246
engaged in combat in Vietnam.
A number of provisions of the proposed code refer to war,
particularly

the chapters

on national

security. 247

At the very

minimum, there should be a legislative definition of the crucial
term. Civil liberties and first amendment rights are deeply involved
in the issue of when the country is at war, both when "war" is an
element of an offense and so that the increased penalties applicable
to a number of proposed sections will be imposed only in the
circumstances determined by Congress itself, rather than by inconsistent rulings of separate courts. If Congress enacts these measures at all, it should accompany them with a definition of war with
which no one can quarrel-that this country is at "war" when
248
Congress has declared war in accordance with the Constitution.
ELIMINATION OF "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" TEST
AND

RESTORATION

OF "GUILT

BY

ASSOCIATION"

The proposed criminal code further threatens precious civil
liberties by the effective elimination of the "clear and present
danger" test from the analysis developed in first amendment cases in
which the national security has allegedly been endangered. 249 A
section penalizing instigation of overthrow or destruction of the
government 2 50 appears to be a statutory attempt to overcome the
constitutional limitations placed by the Supreme Court on similar
statutes.
This section provides:
A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to bring about the
246 Cf. Loane, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 MIL. L. REV. 43, 62 (1965).
247 See, e.g., S. I §§ I1II (sabotage), 1112 (impairing military effectiveness), 1114 (impair-

ing military effectiveness by a false statement), 1116 (obstructing military recruitment or
induction), 1117 (inciting or aiding mutiny, insubordination, or desertion), 1121 (espionage),
1122 (disclosing national defense information).
24s Comment, supra note 115, at 934-35. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. For a review of the
constitutional convention's debates on warmaking see Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain
of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 527,
602-13 (1974).
249 For a discussion of the "clear and present danger" test as it has developed in first

amendment cases since the opinion in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), see Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger"Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1163 (1970); Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-FromSchenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
313 (1952); Strong, Fifty Years of "Clearand Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-And
Beyond, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 41. For the early views of this writer see Note, Schneiderman v. United
States: Imputation of Guilt and Free Speech, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 222, 229-30 (1944).
250 S. 1 § 1103.
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forcible overthrow or destruction of the government of the
United States or of any state as speedily as circumstances permit,

he:
(1) incites other persons to engage in conduct that then
or at some future time would facilitate the forcible overthrow or
destruction of such government; or

(2) organizes, leads, recruits members for, or participates as an active member in, an organization or group that
has as a purpose the incitement described in paragraph
(1).251

The problem presented by this proposal, as manifested by the
unpleasant history of prosecutions under state anarchy and criminal syndicalism statutes25 2 and the Smith Act, 253 is how to protect,
first amendment rights from limitation by those who fear minority

or unpopular beliefs and expressions. The Supreme Court has
long wrestled with the problem. Although some judges 254 and
commentators 25 5 view first amendment freedoms as absolute, the
21 Id. § 1103(a) (emphasis added). The provisions of S. 1400 § 1103 were virtually
identical except that it would have punished a person who "remains an active member" of a
proscribed organization. For a discussion of the associational aspect of S. I see notes 271-84
infra and accompanying text.
252 See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353
(1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
For discussion of these statutes see E. DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1939); W. GELLHORN, THE STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952).
Although states may no longer proscribe overthrow of the federal government, they may
protect their own government. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 500, 509 (1956); Polur,
From Gitlow to Epton-Vew York's Resurrected CriminalAnarchy Statute-The FirstAmendment and
National Policy, 16 N.Y.L.F. 93, 98 n.24 (1970).
253 The Smith Act, ch. 439, tit. I, §§ 2, 3, 5, 54 Stat. 671 (1940), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2385 (1970), provides criminal sanctions for
[w]hoever knowingly or willfully advocates.., or teaches the duty... or propriety
of overthrowing . . . the government . . . or
Whoever, with intent to cause ... overthrow ...prints, publishes... any written or

printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty . . . or propriety of
overthrowing or destroying any government . . . by force or violence ....
The Smith Act also prohibits organization of or membership with knowledge of the purpose in
"any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overth row or
destruction of any such government by force or violence." Id.
Although enacted in 1940 on the brink of World War 11, there were few prosecutions
brought under the Act until the emergence of the Cold War and the successful prosecution of
eleven leaders of the Communist Party in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).
That decision opened the door to the prosecution of scores of other Communist Party leaders.
See Mollan, Smith Act Prosecutions:The Effect of the Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U. PITT. L. REV.
705, 708-10 (1965).
254 These views have been expressed both judicially and extrajudicially. Compare Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,456-57 (1969) (Douglasj., concurring) with Black, The Bill of Rights
and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 43 (E. Cahn ed. 1963).
255 See, e.g., Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245. See
generally Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-10 (1965).
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activities
Court has upheld the proscription of otherwise protected
256
when they have posed a threat to national security.
It was early declared, however, by Justice Holmes in Schenck v.
United States, 25 7 that liability for speech must depend on
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring25 8about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.
25 9
Justice Brandeis, in a concurring opinion to Whitney v. California,
later stressed the importance of a finding that "the incidence of the
evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is
'
opportunity for full discussion . 261
The importance of "imminence" of danger as expressed by
Justices Holmes and Brandeis was significantly diminished by the
26
Court's holding in Dennis v. United States:
"In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,'
discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free
26 2
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
250 See generally Developments-National Security, supra note 99, at 1133-89.
257 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
258 Id. at 52. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of

June 15, 1917,ch. 30, § 3,40 Stat. 217, 219. 249 U.S. at48-49. In sustaining the conviction based
upon printed advocacy of resistance to military induction, the Court noted:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and
that no court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.
Id. at 52. See also Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 214-15 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919). Although Schenck was decided under a statute which prohibited certain
utterances during time of war only, later courts applied the same rationale to a statute
proscribing such activity at all times. See Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137, 140-41, 144-45
(8th Cir. 1943).
259 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927).

260 Id. at 377. The majority upheld the application of the California syndicalism act to a
member of the Communist Labor Party, citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,666-68(1925)
for the proposition
that a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who abuse this freedom
by utterances inimical to the public welfare... and [which] threaten. .. overthrow ....
274 U.S. at 371. The Court in Gitlow had rejected application of the Schenck "clear and present
danger" test on the ground that it
has no application to those [cases] like the present, where the legislative body itself has
previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances of a
specified character.
268 U.S. at 671. The Holmes-Brandeis rationale, however, was preferred by later Courts.
Linde, supra note 249, at. 1173. Whitney was specifically overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
26! 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

262 Id. at 510 (brackets by the Court) (quoting from ChiefJudge Learned Hand's opinion
for the circuit court, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)).
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By applying this test, the Court was able to affirm the conviction of
eleven Communist Party leaders for conspiring to teach and advocate overthrow of the government as tenets of the Communist
Party.

26 3

Almost two decades later, however, the Court warned, in
Brandenburg v. Ohio,2 64 that such advocacy may only be proscribed
if it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action. ' 265 Although Brandenburg did not specifically overrule Dennis, the court took the position that Dennis had upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act
on the theory that the Smith Act embodied these principles and
had been construed in accordance with them.

266

Accordingly, it is

Brandenburg that furnishes the paradigm of constitutionality
against which this section of S. 1 must be tested.
The proposed section requires "intent to bring about the forcible
overthrow or destruction of the government . . . as speedily as

circumstances permit. ' 26 7 This language is undoubtedly derived
from the charge to the jury in Dennis, which indicated that the
defendants might be found guilty under the Smith Act if their actions
were intended to bring about " 'overthrow . . . as speedily as cir-

cumstances would permit.' ",268 The Supreme Court construed this
to mean "that the revolutionists would strike when they thought
...341 U.S. at 516-17. The Court "reject[ed] the contention that success or probability of
success is the criterion." Id. at 510. Instead, the Court noted the danger of the physical and
political damage to the nation created by "an attempt to overthrow the Government by force,
even though doomed from the outset." Id. at 509.
For a discussion of Dennis see Boudin, "SeditiousDoctrines" and the "Clearand Present Danger"
Rule (pt. 2), 38 VA. L. REV. 315, 324-56 (1952).
264 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See generally Linde, supra note 249.
265 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted). In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court held the
Ohio criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional on its face because it failed to distinguish
"terms of mere advocacy ... from incitement to imminent lawless action."Id. at 448-49 (footnote
omitted).
266 Id. at 447-48 n.2. The Court emphasized the distinction made in Dennis between mere
advocacy and "its tendency to produce forcible action." Id. Although this distinction was indeed
made in Dennis, that decision did not require the "imminence" of lawless action as did
Brandenburg.
The Court early recognized that the mere abstract teaching of forcible overthrow or
revolutionary doctrines could not constitutionally be proscribed. See Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 664-65 (1925). However, this distinction has often been strained. The Dennis Court
was thus able to hold that
[i]f Government is aware that a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to
indoctrinate its members and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Government is required.
341 U.S. at 509.
26 S.
§ 1103(a).
266

341 U.S. at 499.
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the time was ripe. '26 9 Brandenburg applies a stricter rule than did
Dennis, requiring that the advocacy be likely to produce "imminent
lawless action." S. 1 ignores the Brandenburg limitation and fails to
require that the lawless action intended to be produced or incited
be imminent. 2 70 In fact, the mandate of Brandenburg is specifically
defied in S.l's punishment of incitement to engage in conduct
which "at some future time would facilitate" the overthrow of the
government. Clearly, this constitutes an attempt to have Congress
eliminate by statute the clear and present danger analysis as it has
evolved and culminated in the Brandenburg opinion.
This section of S. 1 also raises important first amendment
questions regarding the constitutional right of freedom of association. It would restore "guilt by association," which had been one of
the provisions of the Smith Act.
Even before Brandenburg,the effective application of the Smith
Act had been precluded by the Court's opinion in Yates v. United
States. 27 t The section of the Act proscribing the organizing of a

group which teaches overthrow was construed to involve only organizing, not continuing organizational activities, so that the statute
27 2
of limitations barred prosecution of Communist Party members.
Yates also limited the application of the Smith Act by requiring that
punishment of advocacy may only occur if "those to whom the
advocacy is addressed . . .[are] urged to do something, now or in
the future, rather than merely to believe in something. '2 73 The

result of Yates was to terminate the rash of Communist Party
prosecutions. 7 4
However, one prosecution under the membership clause was
successful in Scales v. United States, 2 75 but only because the member269

Id. at 510.

270

Cf. Comment, supra note 115, at 927.

It has been suggested that "incitement" alone would not pass constitutional muster, because
Brandenburgmandated that "[t]he incitement must be to 'imminent lawless action.'" Linde, supra
note 249, at 1185. The concept of incitement is intimately related to speech because "[e]very
idea is an incitement." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
271 354 U.S. 298 (1957). For a discussion of Yates see Mollan, supra note 253, at 725-48.
272 354 U.S. at 312.
273 Id. at 325 (emphasis in original). The Court noted:
Instances of speech that could be considered to amount to "advocacy of action" are so
few and far between as to be almost completely overshadowed by the hundreds of
instances in the record in which overthrow, if mentioned at all, occurs in the course of
doctrinal disputation so remote from action as to be almost wholly lacking in probative
value.
Id. at 327. See also Wellman v. United States, 253 F.2d 601,605 (6th Cir. 1958) (applying the Yates
holding).
274 Mollan, supra note 253, at 730. Many of the pending Smith Act cases were dropped,
dismissed, or reversed. Id.
275 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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ship was "active, and not nominal, passive or theoretical."2 76 The
Court further decided that even an active member may not be
punished for membership in an organization whose purpose was to
overthrow the government, absent "a specific intent to further
those purposes.

'2 77

In a case decided the same day, Noto v. United

States,278

the Court reversed a conviction under the Smith Act on
the ground that "it is present advocacy, and not an intent to advocate in the future . . .which is an element of the crime under the
2 79

membership clause.
Viewed in the light of these decisions, the membership clause
of S. 1 fails to pass constitutional muster. Although "specific intent"
and "active" membership are necessary for conviction, the provision fails because it requires that the organization only "have as a
purpose" proscribed incitement. Thus, the organization may have
such purpose, but may take no actions at all to further the so-called
purpose. 28 0 A member or organizer could be convicted on the basis
of guilt by association28 1 with an organization which holds proscribed
beliefs.28 2 And, of course, the whole provision fails because the
incitement which may be a purpose of a proscribed organization is
not such incitement which imminently presents a clear and present
danger to the security of the nation. 28 3 While the Burger Court has
been edging toward restrictive opinions, it is doubtful that it will
approve language that is so blatantly restrictive of first amendment
rights.
276
277

Id. at 208.
Id. The Court rejected Scales' contention that section 4 (f) of the Subversive Ac-

tivities Control Act, which provided that membership in a Communist organization is not
itself a violation of that act or any criminal statute, repealed the membership clause of the
Smith Act. Id. at 208-09. Cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (other sections of Act held unconstitutional). The
Court determined that the requirement of "active membership" with "specific intent" saved
the membership clause from such repeal. 367 U.S. at 208-09. Cf. Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608 (1967).
278 367 U.S. 290 (1961). For discussion of Scales and Noto see The Supreme Court, 1960
Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 111-17 (1961).
279 367 U.S. at 298 (emphasis in original). On the facts before it, the Court noted that
[t]he most that can be said is that the evidence ... might justify an inference that
the leadership of the Party was preparing the way for a situation in which future
acts of sabotage might be facilitated, but there is no evidence that such acts of
sabotage were presently advocated.
Id.
280 Cf. Comment, supra note 115, at 929.
281 For a discussion of the freedom of association see Douglas, The Right of Association,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1963); Nathanson, Freedom of Association and the Questfor Internal
Security: Conspiracyfrom Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1970).
22 This flies in the face of present law. See, e.g., United States v. Schneiderman, 106 F.
Supp. 906, 935 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
283 See notes 249-70 supra and accompanying text.
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Like its legislative source, the Smith Act, this provision of S. 1
clearly has as its real purpose the imposition of a chilling effect upon
the freedom and willingness of persons to join or to form political
organizations. 2 8 4 This damaging effect on constitutional freedom of
association where no action is imminent plainly outweighs any
government interest in national security. This provision of S. 1 is
offensive to the most elementary principles of due process of law and

the protections of the Bill of Rights. It is yet another illustration of
how the proposed federal criminal code subverts the Constitution.
CONSPIRACY

S. 1, as did the Nixon-Mitchell S. 1400 and the Brown Commission before it, continues "much-criticized" aspects of existing conspiracy law. 285 It defines the scope of the proposed federal crime
of conspiracy:
A person is guilty of an offense if he agrees with one or more
persons to engage in conduct, the performance of which would
constitute a crime or crimes, and he or one of such persons in fact
engages in any
conduct with intent to effect any objective of the
28 6
agreement.

The crucial term, "objective of the agreement," is wide-ranging:
[it] includes the commission of a crime, escape from the scene of a

crime, distribution of the fruits of a crime, and any measure for
284 The membership clause has been called "the most drastic portion" of the Smith Act
by Professor Chafee. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 470 (194 1).

This section of S. I reflects the Nixon-Mitchell determination to discourage freedom of
association by creating an atmosphere of fear of possible prosecution for the acts, speech,
and purposes of others.
Indicative of this atmosphere is a passage from one of the F.B.I. files stolen from the
Media, Pennsylvania office of the F.B.I. on March 8, 1971. The memo advised that constant
interviews with New Left "subjects and hangers-on ... will enhance the paranoia endemic in
these circles and will further serve to get the point across [that] there is an FBI Agent
behind every mailbox." New Left Notes-Philadelphia,September 16, 1970, Edition # 1, reprinted
in P. COWAN, N. EGLESON & N. HENTOFF, STATE SECRETS 138, 139 (1974).

Additional evidence of government efforts to curtail freedom of association in protest
activities appears in F.B.I. documents which reveal a concerted program of anonymous
letterwriting and attempts to obtain the discharge of teachers from their employment.
N.Y. Times, June 25, 1975, at 19, col. I (N.J. ed.).
285 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3270.
286 S. 1 § 1002(a). The bill retains the present overt act provision of the current code
but does away with the present conspiracy "to defraud the United States." Compare id. with 18
U.S.C. § 371 (1970). See generally Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 920, 944, 946-47 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Conspiracy]. The "defraud"
provision had drawn strong criticism. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Conspiracy, 68 Nw. U.L.
REV. 851, 852-53 & n.Il (1973).
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concealing, or obstructing justice in relation to, any aspect of the
conspiracy.2""

Likewise, the bill's grant of federal jurisdiction over conspiracy is the
28 8
broadest possible.
This conspiracy section must be read in conjunction with the

section covering complicity:
A person is criminally liable for an offense based upon the conduct
of another person if:
(1) he and the other person are coconspirators;
(2) the other person engaged in the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
(3) the conduct2 was a reasonably foreseeable consequence
of the conspiracy. 89

The effect of this provision is to make a person guilty as a principal in
any offense that he may be found to have conspired to commit. This is
so whether or not he aided in committing it, and even if he had
abandoned the conspiracy before the offense was carried out. Addi-

tionally, the use of the loose "reasonably foreseeable" test allows for
criminal conviction of an individual for all kinds of serious offenses
287

S.

I § 1002(b). These specified overt acts should serve "simply to manifest 'that the

conspiracy is at work.'" Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957) (quoting from
Carlson v. United States, 187 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1951)). The Brown Commission
proposed limiting this overt act to conduct constituting "a substantial step" toward substantive criminal activity "on the theory that otherwise the act may be innocent in itself and not

particularly corroborative of the existence of a conspiracy."

BROWN COMMISSION REPORT,

supra note 28, § 1004, Comment 3. Such a progressive step has been abandoned by S. 1.
Likewise, in the specification of "any measure for concealing ... any aspect," not only
the Brown Commission but even the Nixon Administration bill had created an exception:
Only "measures other than silence" directed toward concealment would establish an overt act.
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28, § 1004(3); see S. 1400 § 1002(b). S. 1 rejects this
needed exception.
... S. I § 1002(f) provides for federal jurisdiction whenever
any objective of the conspiracy is a federal crime with regard to which federal
jurisdiction:
(1) is not limited to certain specified circumstances; or
(2) is limited to certain specified circumstances and any such circumstance
exists or has occurred, or would exist or occur if any crime that is an objective
of the conspiracy were committed.
Federal jurisdiction in the proposed title 18 is most comprehensive. See S. I §§ 201-05.
Whereas prior law has established that knowledge of the federal jurisdictional element-for
example, that a conspired theft was of merchandise traveling in interstate commerce-was
necessary for a federal conspiracy conviction, this safeguard seems to be abrogated under S.
1. Cf Comment, supra note 286, at 864.
289 S. 1 § 401(b). The earlier bill, as well as the Brown Commission, incorporated an
explicit reference in the conspiracy section to the applicable complicity provision. S. I leaves
this important cross-reference to be discovered only by the prudent reader of the bill.
Compare S. I § 1002 with S. 1400 § 1002(d) and BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28,
§ 1004(5).
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"on the basis of negligence or stupidity," where the ultimate results of
the conspiracy were "never contemplated. '2 90 These abuses are
compounded by the affirmative defense subsection. The only
affirmative defense specified by S. 1 is that the alleged conspirator,
showing "a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal
intent, .

.

. prevented the commission of every crime that was an

objective of the conspiracy.
2' 92

theory of withdrawal"

2 9'

This "stringent-and less desirable-

stems from one anomalous case 293 and

would only seem to be justified on the "unique facts" of that case.29 4
Such a requirement has been strongly criticized on practical grounds:
"A doctrine which permits withdrawal only through confession is not
calculated to increase the number of persons who abandon criminal
enterprises. ' ' 2 9' This ismerely an unjust attempt to expand criminal
conspiracy liability to its maximum limit.
Still another abuse of the law of conspiracy is found in the
punitive practice of imposing "consecutive sentences for plotting to
commit a crime and actually committing it."'29 6 It is self-evident that

maximum sentences authorized for substantive crimes allow for the
fact that more than one person could be involved, i.e., that there
was a conspiracy. 29 7 It should at the very least be held that conviction of the substantive crime embraces within its scope as an integral part thereof the conspiracy to commit the same crime, and that
there cannot be dual punishment for the fragmented offenses of
committing the act and conspiring to commit it. Yet, while the
Brown Commission proposed to do away with this "absurdity," the
2 98
Nixon bill and S. 1 perpetuate it.
290

Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3270.

291 S. 1 § 1002(c) (emphasis added).
292 Developments--Conspiracy,supra note 286, at 958. The better-reasoned majority rule
requires only a renunciation which is communicated to a defendant's coconspirators in order
to dissuade them from pursuing the conspiracy's ends. Id.
29 Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1932).
294 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 62, at 486-87 (1972). A

major aspect of the Eldredge conspiracy was the concealment of prior embezzlements.
Under these circumstances, held the court, a withdrawal accomplished by anything less than
a revelation of the concealed crimes would not have been "effective." Eldredge v. United States,
62 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1932).
295 Developments-Conspiracy, supra note 286, at 959.
296 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3270.
297 Id. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
298 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 3270. Compare BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 28, § 3204(2) (b) (absolute prohibition of such dual sentencing) with S. 1400 § 2303(a)
(court's discretion) and S. 1 § 2304(a) (court's discretion, with guidelines). See also Pinkerton
v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648-50 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (direct analogy to
double-jeopardy violation).
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The entire conspiracy section reinforces the oft-quoted criticism by Judge Learned Hand that conspiracy is the "darling of the
modern prosecutor's nursery.

' 299

S. 1 reflects the Nixon Adminis-

tration's attitude of heavy reliance on the charge of conspiracy as a
device to facilitate the prosecutor's task. It allows the conviction of
those whom it is difficult to prove violated the substantive law.
There is grim irony in the fact that Messrs. Mitchell, Haldeman,
Ehrlichman, Mardian and others who made such widespread use
of conspiracy indictments-and, in the case of antiwardemonstrator prosecutions, nearly all of these charges were summarily rejected by judges and juries alike-should themselves have
been hoist by their own petard. It remains true, however, that the
vice of overuse of the conspiracy approach in prosecution remains
the same, regardless of who is the defendant. The effect of this
overuse is to create too much of a weakening of the procedural
safeguards afforded those accused only of substantive crimes. 3 0
Justice Jackson has pointed out that this "loose practice . . . consti-

'
tutes a serious threat to fairness in our administration of justice. "301
S. 1, by maximizing the applicability of the more questionable
aspects of federal conspiracy law, ensures a maximization of its

abuse.

3 02

RIOT LEGISLATION

The riot control provisions of S. 1303 seriously threaten the
exercise of constitutional rights of freedom of speech and of association. In this respect, S. 1 is even more objectionable than the
existing riot law.3 04 The present law, enacted with great parliamenHarrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
See generally Developments-Conspiracy, supra note 286, at 975-1000.
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446 (1949) (concurring opinion).
Cf. Comment, Conspiracy in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Too Little Reform, 47
TULANE L. REV. 1017, 1037-38 (1973):
The conspiracy provision in the proposed Federal Criminal Code has made some
cosmetic improvements, but the essence of the traditional law of conspiracy will remain
the same. There is no historic basis for assuming that prosecutors will use discretion
and apply the law of conspiracy only against those agreements involving great danger
or systematic criminal activity, and neither is there any basis for hoping that the courts,
even though willing, can so limit the broad letter of the law. Unless the proposed
Federal Criminal Code makes a fundamental departure from the traditionally broad
conspiracy law, the courts will continue to be faced with the troublesome manifestations from "the limitless capacity of conspiracy theory to expand itself."
(Footnote omitted) (quoting from United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165,185 n.2 (lst Cir. 1969)
(Coffin, J., dissenting in part)).
303 S. I §§ 1831-34.
304 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-02 (1970). Section 2101(a) (1) provides:
299
300
30
302
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tary haste in panicky reaction to the civil disorders of the 1960's ,305
is a prime example of "inept legislative draftsmanship. ' 30 6 Its constitutionality has been only narrowly upheld in United States v.
Dellinger,307 over a vigorous dissent. Before giving any consideration to the sweeping invasion of constitutional rights represented
by the antiriot provisions of S. 1, Congress must face the more
basic question of whether the present statute should not be repealed.
Aside from infringement upon freedom of travel, 30 8 the primary objection to the present vague antiriot law stems from its
Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility of interstate or
foreign commerce . . . with intent-

(A) to incite a riot; or
(B) to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or carry on a riot; or
(C) to commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or
(D) to aid or abet any person in inciting or participating in or carrying on a
riot or committing any act of violence in furtherance of a riot;
and who either during the course of any such travel or use or thereafter performs or
attempts to perform any other overt act for any purpose specified in subparagraph
(A), (B), (C), or (D) of this paragraphShall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
There is no section 2101 (a) (2). (This is an excellent instance of the sloppy drafting of this law.
See note 306 infra.) A riot is defined as
a public disturbance involving (1)an actor acts of violence by one or more persons part
of an assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and
present danger of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other
person or to the person of any other individual or (2) a threat or threats of... violence
by one or more persons part of an assemblage of three or more persons having,
individually or collectively, the ability of immediate execution of such threat or threats,
where the performance of the threatened act or acts of violence would constitute a
clear and present danger of, or would result in, damage or injury to the property of
any other person or to the person of any other individual.
18 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (1970). For the provisions of section 2102(b) see note 315 infra. See generally
Comment, The FederalRiot Act and The FirstAmendment, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-CIV. LIB. L. REV.
393 (1970).
301Comment, Riot Legislation: A Tale of Two Eras, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 976, 977-80 (1973).
"I United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,412 (7th Cir. 1972) (Pell,J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). For example, one subsection is superfluous
and another nonsensical. Comment, supra note 305, at 980 & nn.32, 33.
307 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). This was the appeal of the
"Chicago Seven" convictions. In an earlier decision on a declaratory judgment action by the
eventual defendants in Dellinger, it was held that the allegations of unconstitutionality were
insubstantial. National Mobilization Comm. to End the War in Viet Nam v. Foran, 297 F. Supp.
1,3-4 (N.D. III. 1968), affd, 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969); accord, United States v. Hoffman, 334
F. Supp. 504, 509 (D.D.C. 1971); In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Cal.), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935
(1970).
3" One decision has held that the present law does not infringe upon
the right to
travel, but gave no reasoning for this conclusion and cited no authorities. United States v.
Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D.D.C. 1971). In other cases this issue seems to have been
mingled with first amendment issues. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340,
358-59 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See also note 318 infra.
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restrictions on freedom of speech. The constitutional requirements
for legislation in this sensitive area were clearly stated by the
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio: 30 9 It is impermissible for a
statute to define an offense "in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action."'310 In addition,
the actions proscribed must be "likely to incite or produce such action." 311 In its attempt to reconstruct the meaning of Congress, the
Dellinger court, while holding the antiriot law constitutional, recognized that the validity of the law was a "close" question.3 1 2 Circuit
Judge Pell, while joining in the reversal of the convictions in Dellinger, felt constrained to dissent on the issue of constitutionality of
the statute.3 1 3 To the majority's claim that the issue was "close,"
Judge Pell responded:
I entertain no doubts but that the statute . . . is facially
unconstitutional in that it is clearly 3violative
of the First Amend'4
ment right of freedom of speech.
The law's cryptically worded definitional section 31 5 was for
Judge Pell only "the first determinative step leading to and
through the gateway of First Amendment violations.
309

' 31 6

Second,

395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).

Id. at 448-49 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 447 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
312 472 F.2d at 362. Stated the majority:
310

3'

We do not pretend to minimize the first amendment problems presented on
the face of this statute ....
[T]he statute could result in punishment of one who ...
attempted to make a speech or circulate a handbill for the purpose of encouraging
three people to riot. Arguably the statute does not require that the speech, if made,
or the handbill, if circulated, succeed in any substantial degree in encouraging the
audience to riot. Arguably a frustrated attempt to speak or circulate would not
achieve the constitutionally essential relationship with action in any event ...
Although we reject these arguments . . . we acknowledge the case is close.
Id.
313 Id. at 409. The majority had reversed on the basis of procedural irregularities at
trial. See id. at 377, 380, 382-85, 391, 409.
314 Id. at 409.
315 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (1970) provides:

[T]he term "to incite a riot", or "to organize, promote, encourage, participate in, or
carry on a riot", includes, but is not limited to, urging or instigating other persons
to riot, but shall not be deemed to mean the mere oral or written . . . expression of
belief, not involving advocacy of any act ... of violence or assertion of the rightness of
. . . any such act ....
(Emphasis added.)
3 1 472 F.2d at 412. This awkwardly worded section presented "the
matter of the
so-called 'double negative.' "Id. The Dellinger majority laconically pointed out that "a careful
exclusion from an exclusion is at least likely to result in an inclusion." Id. at 363. Nonetheless, and without so much as a reference to Brandenburg, it proceeded to uphold the
definitional section against claims of vagueness and the "chilling" of first amendment rights
on the basis of strained references to the supposed intent of Congress and the unlikelihood
of prosecutorial abuse of discretion. Id. at 363-64.
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he criticized the lack of a "required causal relationship between the
travel with intent and the riot actually incited.

31

7

Finally, although

he did not deny that a valid antiriot law could be enacted, he
concluded that the present statute was unconstitutional on more
general grounds:
A "law" which upon reasonable construction would, by its deterrent threat of punishment for the mere expression of ideas or
beliefs, cellularly isolate the speaker from potential listeners in all
of the states of the Union except
his own would, in my opinion,
318
abridge freedom of speech.

This is not, of course, to say that Congress could not enact legislation punishing those who intentionally incite major riots having an
interstate impact; what it did enact, however, is constitutionally
infirm.
These criticisms of existing law are squarely applicable to the
proposals for antiriot legislation contained in S. 1. It defines a
"riot" as
a public disturbance involving an assemblage of five or more
persons that, by violent and tumultuous conduct, creates
319 a grave
danger of injury or damage to persons or property.
While avoiding the verbal obscurity of present law, this proposal is
Judge Pell's response was well-taken:
With all respect, the majority's attempted saving construction . . . is not only
strained beyond reasonable acceptability but is unsupported historically. Further,
such a construction provides no guidance for the interstate traveller who intends to
speak of the rightness of violence as a last resort ....He will be caught in the same
net as the true inciter . . . at the statutorily uncontrolled option of a comminatory
prosecutor.
Id. at 412. Thus, he claimed, the law was invalid under the precepts of Brandenburg.Id. at
413.
Secondly, he pointed out that the statute's prohibition of "urging or instigating other
persons to riot"-where "urging" can carry a wide range of meaning-clearly failed the dual
test of Brandenburg. Id. at 414.
I Id. at 414. He explained:
I cannot conceive the constitutional validity of a statute which in this open-ended
manner punishes a person at the federal level for what would otherwise be a local
crime only because at some time in his past he had crossed a state line ... with a
nefarious intent. . . . No Convicted criminal on probation is placed under such
severe nonterminal strictures.
Id.
318 Id. at 415. The restriction of such a statute necessarily infringes on the constitutional
"free[dom] to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by . . .
regulations which unreasonably ... restrict this movement." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 629 (1969). See generally United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). Judge Pell
recognized that the inroads on fundamental constitutional freedoms posed by the present
riot statute are clearly not reasonable. See 472 F.2d at 415.
319S. 1 § 1834.
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patently overbroad. It makes no distinction between a gardenvariety barroom brawl and a major insurrection which might ra3 20
tionally be within the proper scope of federal concern.
Another anomaly in the proposed code is that a person may be
found guilty of leading a riot 32' notwithstanding that no riot-even
under S. l's expansive definition-ever takes place. 322 S. 1 further
fails to provide the provisions recommended by the Brown Commission to prevent the abuse of conspiracy law so as to punish mere
speech as incitement to riot, where there is no imminent danger of
mass disorder.3 2 3 Such a failure flies in the face of first amendment
freedoms as well as the spirit of Brandenburg.
Finally, it should be noted that the bill now being considered
by the Senate is unreasonably punitive. A violation will subject the
offender to a maximum of seven years' imprisonment and a fine of
The Brown Commission recognized to some extent the absurdity of federal prosecution of such minor affrays as would be embraced by such a definition. See BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28, § 1801, Comment. For this reason its proposal limited prosecutions where the "riot" had less than 100 participants or had only an intrastate instigation. Id.
§ 1801(4).
The language of S. 1 parallels that of D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 22-1122 (Supp. 1970).
The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in United States v. Matthews, 419 F.2d
1177, 1180-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969), for no better reasoning than that, in the eyes of the court,
"[t]here are few citizens indeed who do not know a public riot when they see one." Id. at
1182.
One court, at least, has had the perception to see the ridiculous nature of defining such
a minor affray as a "riot." It noted, in striking down a riot statute that was couched in terms
of a tumultuous gathering of three or more persons: "Three persons in assembly ... would
have to exert their physical capabilities to a considerable degree to meet with appreciable
disturbance or tumult." Longshoremen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp. 65, 101 (D.
Hawaii 1949), rev'd, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1951). While this decision was reversed for an
improper assumption of equity jurisdiction, its rationale is of weightier substance than the
lame "I know it when I see it" apologetic of Matthews. See also Wilkinson, supra note 9, at 304.
321 S. 1 § 1831.
322 Section 1831(a) defines as an offense "caus[ing] a riot by incitement." But "incite"
may mean either to "urge on" or "to bring into being." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY 1142 (1963); cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (4th ed. 1951). If it is to be the
second definition which prevails, a person would not violate the proposed section 1831
unless there is proof that an actual riot occurred. Yet this is the precise difficulty-the
selection of one meaning where other meanings are equally plausible-which Judge Pell
found to require a finding of unconstitutional vagueness in Dellinger. 472 F.2d at 414
(dissenting opinion) (discussing the word "urge").
In criticizing similar language in the original Nixon Administration bill, one writer has
argued that other references in that bill to "the riot" should sway any interpretation toward
the second definition. Comment, supra note 305, at 981-82. Such an analysis, when applied
to S. 1, falls apart. The jurisdiction subsection refers to "the offense" more often than "the
riot." See S. I § 183 1(c); cf. id. §§ 1832(c), 1833(c). While the significance of this ambiguity of
meaning is that the draftsmen intended to give the antiriot provisions the broadest possible
scope, this has been done at the expense of constitutionally impermissible vagueness.
323 See BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28, § 1801(2).
120
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These measures are harsher 'than the existing law,
32 5
and even more punitive than the Nixon Administration bill.
Draconian retaliation such as this is highly questionable in the light
of recent disclosures which have made manifest a staggering revelation of governmental misconduct, the use of agents provocateurs
326
to break up radical organizations by taking ultra-left positions,
and the fact that objective observers have concluded that what
transpired at the Democratic National Convention in 1968 was in
actuality a police riot rather than, as the simplistic Mayor Daley
view would have it, one of agitators crossing state lines to incite
$100,000.324

3

violence.

27

The existing law came out of a mood of fear and near-hysteria
stemming from a period of civil disorder which has passed. Today's comparative tranquillity both in the urban ghettos and on the
campuses means that any rationalization of the faulty draftsmanship and unconstitutional infringements upon first amendment
rights contained in the present antiriot statute is no longer defensible. Yet S. 1 carries over the general substance of the present law
into a proposed federal criminal code which, if enacted, will be
with us probably for fifty or sixty years. Unless political expediency, the panic of the 1960's and the satisfaction of the framers of the
proposed Code that antiriot legislation already on the statute books
has been approved by a majority of only one circuit court is to be
accepted as a proper substitute for Congress' obligation to determine
whether such legislation is constitutional and accords with the more
tranquil period in which this country now fortunately finds itself,
there is utterly nojustification for carrying forward into the proposed
code antiriot legislation that was blindly and hastily accepted in an
entirely different era.
324

Violation of either section 1831-leading a riot--or section 1832-supplying arms

for a riot-is a felony, carrying a fine of $100,000. Within each section, various violations are
graded into either three- or seven-year prison sentences. See S. I §§ 1831(b), 1832(b),
2201(b) (1) (A), 2301(b) (4), (5). A violation of section 1833-participating in a riot-is only a
misdemeanor, carrying a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment of up to one year. See
id. §§ 1833(b), 2201(b) (1) (B), 2301(b) (6), (7).
32 Compare note 324 supra and accompanying text with 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a) (1970) (five
years' imprisonment and $10,000 fine) and S. 1400 §§ 1801(b), 2201(b) (4), (5), 2301 (b) (4),
(5) (three years' imprisonment and $25,000 fine, or, if riot is in a federal prison, seven years'
imprisonment and $50,000 fine).
326

See notes 208-09 supra.

327 THE WALKER REPORT TO THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE,

RIGHTS IN CONFLICT vii-xiii

(1968).
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DEFENSES

Alert commentators called attention to two brief sections of S.
1400 that afforded protection to public officials and their private
agents against being convicted of federal crimes, not only of the
Watergate variety but also of other kinds, by establishing the defense that they had followed superior orders. 328 The parallel of
these provisions to the Nuremberg defenses raised by top Nazis at
the war crimes trial in Nuremberg, as well as by Adolf Eichmann
in his trial in Israel, was self-evident. Despite the hearings of the
Ervin committee regarding Watergate 2 9 and those of the House
Judiciary committee into the impeachment of President Nixon, 33 0 a
modified Nuremberg defense still appears in S. 1.
The first section establishes a defense based on exercise of
public authority. 331 This provision states:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that the
conduct charged was required or authorized by law:
.. . to carry out the defendant's authority as a public
servant, or as a person acting at the direction of a public
servant .... 332
The other section creates an exception to the general rule of
criminal law that knowledge of illegality is not an element of the
offense by providing a defense of official misstatement of the
law. 333 It provides:

It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any
federal statute that the defendant's conduct in fact conformed
with an official statement of the law that was applicable to the
conduct, that subsequent to the conduct was determined to be
invalid or erroneous, and that was in fact:
(b) contained in a public record or a public communication constituting:
(2) ... an official grant of express permission to the
defendant . . .. 3
Korn & Craig, supra note 9, § C, at 1, col. 2. See S. 1400 §§ 521, 532.
329 Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 Before the Sen. Select Comm. on

328

Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
330 Hearingsto Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Exist for the House of Representatives to
Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon Before the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
331 S. 1 § 541.

Id. § 541(a).
333 Id. § 552.

332

331 Id. § 552(b) (2). This section also recognizes an affirmative defense based upon a
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The language of these two sections has been somewhat cur33
tailed in contrast to the more sweeping versions in S. 1400. 1
Nevertheless, the scope for potential mischief is still alarming.
They are lineal descendants of the notorious "I was just following
orders" and "I was just doing my duty" excuses that have come to
be known as the Nuremberg defenses. This was precisely the defense raised by the two former White House aides John
Ehrlichman and Egil Krogh against indictments arising out of the
burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. They moved
for dismissal of the charges arguing that they had been engaged in
conduct as " 'officers of the United States.' "336 Under the provisions of S. 1, they would claim protection for "conduct... required
3 37
•. .to carry out the defendant's authority as a public servant.
The contention was carried even farther by Ehrlichman's attorney, who stated: "'The President . . . specifically directed
Ehrlichman to make known to [the co-defendants] that [the
statute, a Supreme Court opinion, a judicial or administrative adjudication to which the
defendant was a party, and an opinion in writing by an agency head. Id. §§ 552(a), (b). The
defense in all instances requires that "the defendant [had] acted in reasonable reliance on such
statement and believed in good faith that his conduct did not constitute an offense." Id. § 552.
311S. 1400 provided a defense based upon public duty with the following language:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that the defendant
reasonably believed that the conduct charged was required or authorized by law:
(1)to carry out his duty as a public servant, or as a person acting at the
direction of a public servant ....
S. 1400 §521(a)(1). The predecessor bill's official misstatement of law defense section
provided:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that the
defendant's conduct in fact conformed with an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous:
(a) which is contained in:
(1) a statute; or
(2) a decision of the United States Supreme Court; or
(b) which is contained in:
(1) ajudicial decision entered in a proceeding to which the defendant was
a party;
(2) an administrative decision entered in a proceeding to which the defendant was a party, or an administrative grant of permission to the defendant, or
(3) an official, written interpretation issued by the head of a government
agency, or his delegate, charged by law with responsibility for administration of
the law defining the offense
if the defendant acted in reasonable reliance on such statement of the law and with
a good faith belief that his conduct did not constitute an offense.
Id. § 532 (emphasis added). S. 1 simply replaced the "administrative grant of permission"
with "an official grant of express permission." However, it does limit the scope of the
protection somewhat by requiring "a public record or a public communication" of the
authorization. See text accompanying note 334 supra. Nevertheless, there is nothing that
prevents classification of the authorization by a member of the executive department and
thereby maintaining the clandestine quality that permeated Watergate activities.
336Korn & Craig, supra note 9, § C, at 1, col. 4.
131S. 1 § 541(a) (1).
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Ellsberg investigation] was impressed with a national security
characteristic.' "33 Using the hornbook principle that commission
of a crime requires mens rea, a guilty mind, Ehrlichman's attorney
argued:
"The essence of the crime of conspiracy is ...

evil intent. The

association of persons with honest intent is not a conspiracy, and
the association of Ehrlichman with the others on a presidential
339
assignment cannot be transformed into a criminal conspiracy.
This contention links together the "public servant" provision and
the "official grant of express permission" in the misstatement of
law section.
However, the definitive answer to this defense was eloquently
given by Justice Robert Jackson in his opening statement at the
Nuremberg trials:
[O]ne who has committed criminal acts may not take refuge in
superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were acts of
states. These twin principles working together have heretofore
resulted in immunity for practically everyone concerned in the
really great crimes against peace and mankind. 4
These sections, especially the official misstatement of law defense, may be a valuable addition to federal criminal jurisprudence
in cases involving private individuals. 34 1 However, there is great
potential for abuse when one public official gives "an official grant
of express permission" to another official who then engages in
"conduct ... to carry out [that] authority. ' 34 2 After Watergate and
a3 Korn & Craig, supra note 9, § C, at 1, col. 4.
339 Id.
'10 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 168 (1946) (Opening Address for the United

States).
341 For an article supporting the defense of mistake of law from the academic point of
view see Hall & Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1941). See also
BROWN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 28, § 609, Comment.
342 Compare S. I § 552(b) (2) with id. § 541(a) (1). Cf. Korn & Craig, supra note 9, § C, at
5, col. 5. The potential for abuse of this defense was graphically described within the context
of the S. 1400 proposals:
Imagine what might have happened if S. 1400 had already been law when
Ehrlichman and Krogh were contemplating a burglary. Ehrlichman need only seek
an "administrative grant of permission" from, say a Justice Department confidante,
and Krogh need only plan to persuade a jury that he "reasonably believed" the law
not only authorized but required him to order the burglary.
Krogh's lawyers could submit a memorandum from the President describing
the national security implications of the break-in. Ehrlichman could testify that he
told Krogh national security made it all perfectly legal. And Ehrlichman's lawyers
could introduce his "administrative grant of permission." Harry Truman's buck
would be passed so rapidly from one person to another that, in the end, no criminal
would have committed the crime, only public servants doing their duty.
Id. at 1, col. 5.
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the impeachment hearings, it is startling to find in S. 1 proposals
which would have immunized President Nixon's aides from much
of the criminal responsibility for their illegal acts. If enacted, these
proposals would fuse into federal law the attempted defenses that
superior orders and duty justify lawbreaking on the part of gov3 43
ernment officials.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing analysis has highlighted some of the massive
assaults upon constitutional liberties that are characteristic of S. 1.
There is a very real danger that the size and complexity of this bill
of 753 pages will help conceal not only its undesirable aspects but
also its constitutional pitfalls. There are literally hundreds of separate statutes involved in this proposed code. There is a grave peril
that inadequate attention will be paid to such provisions as have
been dealt with in this paper. In previous years, this country has
had repressive legislation inflicted upon it as parts of omnibus
"anticrime" bills. Those concerned with civil liberties failed to
arouse the country sufficiently to avert the passage of such unfor-5
344 "no knock" entry, 34
tunate statutes as preventive detention,
"dangerous special offenders" provisions, 3 46 and extension of
34
wiretapping. 34 7 It can easily happen again. "
A new criminal code is urgently needed. No one can or should
quarrel with the wisdom of gathering into one code all the
scattered-often obsolete-statutes that in their totality comprise
the federal criminal law. But such a comprehensive code should
not reflect panic and repressiveness. It should instead hold out

"I

For a military-oriented view that the defense of superior orders is impermissible see
Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99, 170-75
(1972). See also T. TAYLOR, GUILT, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE THIRD REICH (1970); T. TAYLOR,
NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970).

For an examination of principles of international law requiring termination of complicity
in illegal superior orders before raising the Nuremberg defense see Falk, The NurembergDefense
in the Pentagon Papers Case, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 208 (1974). Professor Falk concludes
that Ellsberg's exercise of conscience in disclosing the Pentagon Papers provided a basis for his
acquittal under international law. Id. at 237-38.
311 D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 23-1322 (Supp. 1970).
345 Id. § 23-591; 21 U.S.C. § 879 (1970).
346 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970).
347 Id. §§ 2510-20.
348 See Note, Title 11 of the Omnibus Crime ControlAct: A Study in ConstitutionalConflict, 57 GEO.
LJ. 438, 439-40 & n.16 (1968). One of the factors leading to passage of this massive piece of
legislation was that "[flew Senators were familiar with the final version of the bill before it was
reported on the Senate floor."Id. at 440 (footnote omitted). See generally Wilkinson,supra note 9.
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hopes for the accused and the convicted at the same time as it
fully meets the eminently proper demand of the citizenry that they
34 9
be able to walk the streets safely at night.
The code that Congress should enact should be in the spirit
called for by Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark who urged that we "strive to
make our laws instruments of justice, sufficiently strong to snare
the guilty, but discerning enough to ensure that the innocent go
free. '35 0 It should eliminate from our criminal law all the fearful,
repressive statutes that marked the post-World War II period.
Adoption of a federal criminal code framed in that approach
would be the greatest contribution that the Congress and the President could make to celebrate the Bicentennial. It would constitute
a legislative declaration of confidence in our future and would bear
witness to a continuing faith in the wisdom and workability of our
unique Bill of Rights.
The standard has been set in the call to action by Chief Justice
Richard J. Hughes of the New Jersey supreme court. Writing as
chairman of the American Bar Association Commission on Correc'49 See

R.

CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA

17-19 (1970), where the former Attorney General

states:
If we are to deal meaningfully with crime, what must be seen is the dehumanizing effect on the individual of slums, racism, ignorance and violence, of corruptionand impotence to

fuy/ll rights, of poverty and unemployment and idleness, of generations of malnutrition, of
congenital brain damage and prenatalneglect, of sickness and disease, ofpollution, of decrepit,
dirty, ugly, unsafe, overcrowded housing, of alcoholism and narcotics addiction, of avarice,
anxiety,fear,hatred,hopelessnessand injustice.These are thefountainheadsofcrime. They can be
controlled. As imprecise, distorted and prejudiced as our learning is, these sources of crime and
their controllability clearly emerge to any who would see.
The crucial test of American character will be our reaction to the vastness of crime and
turbulence in which we live. It will not be an easy test. The obvious and instinctive reaction is
repressiveness. It will not work. You cannot discipline this turbulent, independent, young mass
society as ifit were a child. Repression is the one clear course toward irreconcilabledivision and
revolution in America. The essential action is to create a wholesome environment. Healthy people
in a just and concerned society will not commit signyifcant crime.
(Emphasis in original.) On the philosophy that must permeate a viable criminal justice system,
Mr. Clark further wrote:
Tolerance, patience, humaneness and a gentle untiring hand will be essential to avoid
division. Too, we must create waysfor the exchange of views among all of ourpeople. Agencies of
criminaljusticemust befair and effective if they are to hold us together in the turbulence of the
years ahead until we have removed the underlying causes of crime in America. Our laws must
provide moral leadership and cannot therefore be themselves immoral. Our purpose as a people
must have a clear andgenerous meaning of equalityfor all.
We must strive tdfu/ll1 the obligations
of a great nation,to achieve needed reforms, to offerfuillment, human dignityand reverencefor
life.
Guided by reason,America will soaron wings of humane concern. Passionis the vital spring
to human action. Fertilized by ideas, passion alone has the power to activate millions. America's
passion must be justice.
Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
350 Clark, supra note 10, at 825.
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tional Services and Facilities, Chief Justice Hughes, then a private
citizen, emphasized the need for corrections reform framed in the
fundamental concept that, "This nation must realize we are our
brother's keeper. '351 And quoting Chief Justice Warren Burger, he
continued:
"[W]hen a sheriff or a marshall takes a man from a courthouse in
a prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three
or ten years, this is our act. We have tolled the bell for him. And
whether we like it or not, we have made him our collective
responsibility.
We are free to do something about him; he is
35 2
not."

The "[s]elf-styled tough crime fighters"3 5 3 who have taken the
lead in sponsoring S. 1 and its predecessor, S. 1400 of the 93rd
Congress, have in actuality introduced a bill that is permeated by
unconstitutional attempts to achieve a simplistic type of law and
order. Harshness and repression are substituted for the lessons of
modern penology. S. 1 has been drafted in the image of the
fearful, punitive men who formed the Nixon Administration. The
revelations of the Ervin Committee3 54 and of the House Judiciary
Committee in its impeachment hearings3 5 5 taught this country how
little that Administration trusted the American people. This coun351

Hughes, Corrections Reform: We Are Our Brother's Keeper, 2
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L. REv. 311,

322 (1971).
352 Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from Burger, "No Man Is an Island," 56 A.B.A.J. 325,
326 (1970)).
'5'
R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 217 (1970). The attitude of the leading spokesman for
S. 1 is reflected in earlier legislative deliberations:
During Congressional consideration of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968 designed to provide federal funding for state and local criminal justice needs,
the issue of corrections caused a major battle. Nationwide, corrections receives
about 25 per cent of all funds provided for the criminal justice process. Self-styled
tough crime fighters like Senators John McClellan of Arkansas and Strom Thurmond of South Carolina wanted to limit funds available for corrections under the
bill to 5 per cent. They joked in public hearings about raising it to 7Y2 per cent.
Could the reason have been that they knew the jails and prisons of their states and
many others are full of Negroes? Fortunately, such a tragic limitation was avoided.
Instead, up to 20 per cent of the grant funds were expendable for corrections. This
compared with a 30 per cent allocation for police to combat organized crime and an
additional 30 per cent for police to control riots. Corrections remains the stepchild
of the criminal justice process. The hard-liners have no interest in corrections. They
want punishment.
Id. at 217-18. This perspective on the administration of criminal justice was also deplored by
Chief Justice Hughes. See Hughes, supra note 351, at 315 & n.18.
34 Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 Before the Sen. Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
...Hearings to Investigate Whether Sufficient Grounds Existfor the House of Representatives to
Exercise its Constitutional Power to Impeach Richard M. Nixon Before the House Comm. on the
.Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
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try would be ill-served indeed if a comprehensive federal criminal
code imbued with the repressive approach of the Nixon Administration toward the difficult problems of crime and punishment in
the America of the last quarter of the twentieth century should be
enacted into law and become our standard for criminal justice for
the next sixty or seventy years.
The type of federal criminal code that this country needs is
most emphatically not that which is contained in S. 1 or in its
House counterpart, H.R. 3907. What is required instead is a code
that reflects confidence in the people and in our constitutional
liberties. The standard, yet to be achieved but urgently needed, is
that which was eloquently expressed two generations ago by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt:
If the fires of freedom and civil liberties burn low in other
lands, they must be made brighter in our own.
If in other lands, the press and books and literature of all kinds
are censored, we must redouble our efforts here to keep them free.
If in other lands the eternal truths of the past are threatened35by
6
intolerance, we must provide a safe place for their perpetuation.
"6 Address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt before the National Education Association,
June 30, 1938, reprinted in 7 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
414, 418 (S. Rosenman ed. 1941). A similar theme was sounded by the Rev. Robert Golledge,
vicar of the Old North Church, Boston, Massachusetts, on the opening of the American
Bicentennial on April 19, 1975:
"Those two lanterns which once shone from this steeple led us to two centuries
of some progress in reason, in liberty, and in faith-but not enough; to some
fulfillment in mind, body and spirit-but not enough; to some gains in thinking,
acting and trusting in freedom-but not enough."
McGrory, The Unperceiving, New York Post, April 21, 1975, at 31, col. 4.

